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ipvs: prevent integer overflow in do_ip_vs_get_ctl()
The get->num_services variable is an unsigned int which is controlled by the user. The struct_size() function ensures that the size calculation does not overflow an unsigned long, however, we are saving the result to an int so the calculation can overflow. Both "len" and "get->num_services" come from the user. This check is just a sanity check to help the user and ensure they are using the API correctly. An integer overflow here is not a big deal. This has no security impact. Save the result from struct_size() type size_t to fix this integer overflow bug. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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@ -3091,12 +3091,12 @@ do_ip_vs_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
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case IP_VS_SO_GET_SERVICES:
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{
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struct ip_vs_get_services *get;
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int size;
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size_t size;
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get = (struct ip_vs_get_services *)arg;
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size = struct_size(get, entrytable, get->num_services);
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if (*len != size) {
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pr_err("length: %u != %u\n", *len, size);
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pr_err("length: %u != %zu\n", *len, size);
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ret = -EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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@ -3132,12 +3132,12 @@ do_ip_vs_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
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case IP_VS_SO_GET_DESTS:
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{
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struct ip_vs_get_dests *get;
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int size;
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size_t size;
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get = (struct ip_vs_get_dests *)arg;
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size = struct_size(get, entrytable, get->num_dests);
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if (*len != size) {
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pr_err("length: %u != %u\n", *len, size);
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pr_err("length: %u != %zu\n", *len, size);
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ret = -EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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