ipvs: prevent integer overflow in do_ip_vs_get_ctl()

The get->num_services variable is an unsigned int which is controlled by
the user.  The struct_size() function ensures that the size calculation
does not overflow an unsigned long, however, we are saving the result to
an int so the calculation can overflow.

Both "len" and "get->num_services" come from the user.  This check is
just a sanity check to help the user and ensure they are using the API
correctly.  An integer overflow here is not a big deal.  This has no
security impact.

Save the result from struct_size() type size_t to fix this integer
overflow bug.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
This commit is contained in:
Dan Carpenter 2025-03-10 10:45:53 +03:00 committed by Pablo Neira Ayuso
parent c21b02fd9c
commit 80b78c39eb

View File

@ -3091,12 +3091,12 @@ do_ip_vs_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
case IP_VS_SO_GET_SERVICES:
{
struct ip_vs_get_services *get;
int size;
size_t size;
get = (struct ip_vs_get_services *)arg;
size = struct_size(get, entrytable, get->num_services);
if (*len != size) {
pr_err("length: %u != %u\n", *len, size);
pr_err("length: %u != %zu\n", *len, size);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@ -3132,12 +3132,12 @@ do_ip_vs_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
case IP_VS_SO_GET_DESTS:
{
struct ip_vs_get_dests *get;
int size;
size_t size;
get = (struct ip_vs_get_dests *)arg;
size = struct_size(get, entrytable, get->num_dests);
if (*len != size) {
pr_err("length: %u != %u\n", *len, size);
pr_err("length: %u != %zu\n", *len, size);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}