linux/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
Paolo Bonzini 86eb1aef72 Merge branch 'kvm-mirror-page-tables' into HEAD
As part of enabling TDX virtual machines, support support separation of
private/shared EPT into separate roots.

Confidential computing solutions almost invariably have concepts of
private and shared memory, but they may different a lot in the details.
In SEV, for example, the bit is handled more like a permission bit as
far as the page tables are concerned: the private/shared bit is not
included in the physical address.

For TDX, instead, the bit is more like a physical address bit, with
the host mapping private memory in one half of the address space and
shared in another.  Furthermore, the two halves are mapped by different
EPT roots and only the shared half is managed by KVM; the private half
(also called Secure EPT in Intel documentation) gets managed by the
privileged TDX Module via SEAMCALLs.

As a result, the operations that actually change the private half of
the EPT are limited and relatively slow compared to reading a PTE. For
this reason the design for KVM is to keep a mirror of the private EPT in
host memory.  This allows KVM to quickly walk the EPT and only perform the
slower private EPT operations when it needs to actually modify mid-level
private PTEs.

There are thus three sets of EPT page tables: external, mirror and
direct.  In the case of TDX (the only user of this framework) the
first two cover private memory, whereas the third manages shared
memory:

  external EPT - Hidden within the TDX module, modified via TDX module
                 calls.

  mirror EPT   - Bookkeeping tree used as an optimization by KVM, not
                 used by the processor.

  direct EPT   - Normal EPT that maps unencrypted shared memory.
                 Managed like the EPT of a normal VM.

Modifying external EPT
----------------------

Modifications to the mirrored page tables need to also perform the
same operations to the private page tables, which will be handled via
kvm_x86_ops.  Although this prep series does not interact with the TDX
module at all to actually configure the private EPT, it does lay the
ground work for doing this.

In some ways updating the private EPT is as simple as plumbing PTE
modifications through to also call into the TDX module; however, the
locking is more complicated because inserting a single PTE cannot anymore
be done atomically with a single CMPXCHG.  For this reason, the existing
FROZEN_SPTE mechanism is used whenever a call to the TDX module updates the
private EPT.  FROZEN_SPTE acts basically as a spinlock on a PTE.  Besides
protecting operation of KVM, it limits the set of cases in which the
TDX module will encounter contention on its own PTE locks.

Zapping external EPT
--------------------
While the framework tries to be relatively generic, and to be
understandable without knowing TDX much in detail, some requirements of
TDX sometimes leak; for example the private page tables also cannot be
zapped while the range has anything mapped, so the mirrored/private page
tables need to be protected from KVM operations that zap any non-leaf
PTEs, for example kvm_mmu_reset_context() or kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast().

For normal VMs, guest memory is zapped for several reasons: user
memory getting paged out by the guest, memslots getting deleted,
passthrough of devices with non-coherent DMA.  Confidential computing
adds to these the conversion of memory between shared and privates. These
operations must not zap any private memory that is in use by the guest.

This is possible because the only zapping that is out of the control
of KVM/userspace is paging out userspace memory, which cannot apply to
guestmemfd operations.  Thus a TDX VM will only zap private memory from
memslot deletion and from conversion between private and shared memory
which is triggered by the guest.

To avoid zapping too much memory, enums are introduced so that operations
can choose to target only private or shared memory, and thus only
direct or mirror EPT.  For example:

  Memslot deletion           - Private and shared
  MMU notifier based zapping - Shared only
  Conversion to shared       - Private only
  Conversion to private      - Shared only

Other cases of zapping will not be supported for KVM, for example
APICv update or non-coherent DMA status update; for the latter, TDX will
simply require that the CPU supports self-snoop and honor guest PAT
unconditionally for shared memory.
2025-01-20 07:15:58 -05:00

419 lines
13 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef __KVM_X86_MMU_INTERNAL_H
#define __KVM_X86_MMU_INTERNAL_H
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <asm/kvm_host.h>
#include "mmu.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PROVE_MMU
#define KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(x) WARN_ON_ONCE(x)
#else
#define KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(x) BUILD_BUG_ON_INVALID(x)
#endif
/* Page table builder macros common to shadow (host) PTEs and guest PTEs. */
#define __PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK GENMASK_ULL(51, 12)
#define __PT_LEVEL_SHIFT(level, bits_per_level) \
(PAGE_SHIFT + ((level) - 1) * (bits_per_level))
#define __PT_INDEX(address, level, bits_per_level) \
(((address) >> __PT_LEVEL_SHIFT(level, bits_per_level)) & ((1 << (bits_per_level)) - 1))
#define __PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(base_addr_mask, level, bits_per_level) \
((base_addr_mask) & ~((1ULL << (PAGE_SHIFT + (((level) - 1) * (bits_per_level)))) - 1))
#define __PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(base_addr_mask, level, bits_per_level) \
((base_addr_mask) & ((1ULL << (PAGE_SHIFT + (((level) - 1) * (bits_per_level)))) - 1))
#define __PT_ENT_PER_PAGE(bits_per_level) (1 << (bits_per_level))
/*
* Unlike regular MMU roots, PAE "roots", a.k.a. PDPTEs/PDPTRs, have a PRESENT
* bit, and thus are guaranteed to be non-zero when valid. And, when a guest
* PDPTR is !PRESENT, its corresponding PAE root cannot be set to INVALID_PAGE,
* as the CPU would treat that as PRESENT PDPTR with reserved bits set. Use
* '0' instead of INVALID_PAGE to indicate an invalid PAE root.
*/
#define INVALID_PAE_ROOT 0
#define IS_VALID_PAE_ROOT(x) (!!(x))
static inline hpa_t kvm_mmu_get_dummy_root(void)
{
return my_zero_pfn(0) << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
static inline bool kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(hpa_t shadow_page)
{
return is_zero_pfn(shadow_page >> PAGE_SHIFT);
}
typedef u64 __rcu *tdp_ptep_t;
struct kvm_mmu_page {
/*
* Note, "link" through "spt" fit in a single 64 byte cache line on
* 64-bit kernels, keep it that way unless there's a reason not to.
*/
struct list_head link;
struct hlist_node hash_link;
bool tdp_mmu_page;
bool unsync;
union {
u8 mmu_valid_gen;
/* Only accessed under slots_lock. */
bool tdp_mmu_scheduled_root_to_zap;
};
/*
* The shadow page can't be replaced by an equivalent huge page
* because it is being used to map an executable page in the guest
* and the NX huge page mitigation is enabled.
*/
bool nx_huge_page_disallowed;
/*
* The following two entries are used to key the shadow page in the
* hash table.
*/
union kvm_mmu_page_role role;
gfn_t gfn;
u64 *spt;
/*
* Stores the result of the guest translation being shadowed by each
* SPTE. KVM shadows two types of guest translations: nGPA -> GPA
* (shadow EPT/NPT) and GVA -> GPA (traditional shadow paging). In both
* cases the result of the translation is a GPA and a set of access
* constraints.
*
* The GFN is stored in the upper bits (PAGE_SHIFT) and the shadowed
* access permissions are stored in the lower bits. Note, for
* convenience and uniformity across guests, the access permissions are
* stored in KVM format (e.g. ACC_EXEC_MASK) not the raw guest format.
*/
u64 *shadowed_translation;
/* Currently serving as active root */
union {
int root_count;
refcount_t tdp_mmu_root_count;
};
union {
/* These two members aren't used for TDP MMU */
struct {
unsigned int unsync_children;
/*
* Number of writes since the last time traversal
* visited this page.
*/
atomic_t write_flooding_count;
};
/*
* Page table page of external PT.
* Passed to TDX module, not accessed by KVM.
*/
void *external_spt;
};
union {
struct kvm_rmap_head parent_ptes; /* rmap pointers to parent sptes */
tdp_ptep_t ptep;
};
DECLARE_BITMAP(unsync_child_bitmap, 512);
/*
* Tracks shadow pages that, if zapped, would allow KVM to create an NX
* huge page. A shadow page will have nx_huge_page_disallowed set but
* not be on the list if a huge page is disallowed for other reasons,
* e.g. because KVM is shadowing a PTE at the same gfn, the memslot
* isn't properly aligned, etc...
*/
struct list_head possible_nx_huge_page_link;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Used out of the mmu-lock to avoid reading spte values while an
* update is in progress; see the comments in __get_spte_lockless().
*/
int clear_spte_count;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* Used for freeing the page asynchronously if it is a TDP MMU page. */
struct rcu_head rcu_head;
#endif
};
extern struct kmem_cache *mmu_page_header_cache;
static inline int kvm_mmu_role_as_id(union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
{
return role.smm ? 1 : 0;
}
static inline int kvm_mmu_page_as_id(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
return kvm_mmu_role_as_id(sp->role);
}
static inline bool is_mirror_sp(const struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
return sp->role.is_mirror;
}
static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_external_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
/*
* external_spt is allocated for TDX module to hold private EPT mappings,
* TDX module will initialize the page by itself.
* Therefore, KVM does not need to initialize or access external_spt.
* KVM only interacts with sp->spt for private EPT operations.
*/
sp->external_spt = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(&vcpu->arch.mmu_external_spt_cache);
}
static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_root_bits(const struct kvm *kvm, const struct kvm_mmu_page *root)
{
/*
* Since mirror SPs are used only for TDX, which maps private memory
* at its "natural" GFN, no mask needs to be applied to them - and, dually,
* we expect that the bits is only used for the shared PT.
*/
if (is_mirror_sp(root))
return 0;
return kvm_gfn_direct_bits(kvm);
}
static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
/*
* When using the EPT page-modification log, the GPAs in the CPU dirty
* log would come from L2 rather than L1. Therefore, we need to rely
* on write protection to record dirty pages, which bypasses PML, since
* writes now result in a vmexit. Note, the check on CPU dirty logging
* being enabled is mandatory as the bits used to denote WP-only SPTEs
* are reserved for PAE paging (32-bit KVM).
*/
return kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size && sp->role.guest_mode;
}
static inline gfn_t gfn_round_for_level(gfn_t gfn, int level)
{
return gfn & -KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level);
}
int mmu_try_to_unsync_pages(struct kvm *kvm, const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
gfn_t gfn, bool synchronizing, bool prefetch);
void kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
void kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
bool kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, u64 gfn,
int min_level);
/* Flush the given page (huge or not) of guest memory. */
static inline void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, int level)
{
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_range(kvm, gfn_round_for_level(gfn, level),
KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level));
}
unsigned int pte_list_count(struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head);
extern int nx_huge_pages;
static inline bool is_nx_huge_page_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
{
return READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages) && !kvm->arch.disable_nx_huge_pages;
}
struct kvm_page_fault {
/* arguments to kvm_mmu_do_page_fault. */
const gpa_t addr;
const u64 error_code;
const bool prefetch;
/* Derived from error_code. */
const bool exec;
const bool write;
const bool present;
const bool rsvd;
const bool user;
/* Derived from mmu and global state. */
const bool is_tdp;
const bool is_private;
const bool nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled;
/*
* Whether a >4KB mapping can be created or is forbidden due to NX
* hugepages.
*/
bool huge_page_disallowed;
/*
* Maximum page size that can be created for this fault; input to
* FNAME(fetch), direct_map() and kvm_tdp_mmu_map().
*/
u8 max_level;
/*
* Page size that can be created based on the max_level and the
* page size used by the host mapping.
*/
u8 req_level;
/*
* Page size that will be created based on the req_level and
* huge_page_disallowed.
*/
u8 goal_level;
/*
* Shifted addr, or result of guest page table walk if addr is a gva. In
* the case of VM where memslot's can be mapped at multiple GPA aliases
* (i.e. TDX), the gfn field does not contain the bit that selects between
* the aliases (i.e. the shared bit for TDX).
*/
gfn_t gfn;
/* The memslot containing gfn. May be NULL. */
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
/* Outputs of kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn(). */
unsigned long mmu_seq;
kvm_pfn_t pfn;
struct page *refcounted_page;
bool map_writable;
/*
* Indicates the guest is trying to write a gfn that contains one or
* more of the PTEs used to translate the write itself, i.e. the access
* is changing its own translation in the guest page tables.
*/
bool write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable;
};
int kvm_tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);
/*
* Return values of handle_mmio_page_fault(), mmu.page_fault(), fast_page_fault(),
* and of course kvm_mmu_do_page_fault().
*
* RET_PF_CONTINUE: So far, so good, keep handling the page fault.
* RET_PF_RETRY: let CPU fault again on the address.
* RET_PF_EMULATE: mmio page fault, emulate the instruction directly.
* RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED: the gfn is write-protected, either unprotected the
* gfn and retry, or emulate the instruction directly.
* RET_PF_INVALID: the spte is invalid, let the real page fault path update it.
* RET_PF_FIXED: The faulting entry has been fixed.
* RET_PF_SPURIOUS: The faulting entry was already fixed, e.g. by another vCPU.
*
* Any names added to this enum should be exported to userspace for use in
* tracepoints via TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM() in mmutrace.h
*
* Note, all values must be greater than or equal to zero so as not to encroach
* on -errno return values.
*/
enum {
RET_PF_CONTINUE = 0,
RET_PF_RETRY,
RET_PF_EMULATE,
RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED,
RET_PF_INVALID,
RET_PF_FIXED,
RET_PF_SPURIOUS,
};
/*
* Define RET_PF_CONTINUE as 0 to allow for
* - efficient machine code when checking for CONTINUE, e.g.
* "TEST %rax, %rax, JNZ", as all "stop!" values are non-zero,
* - kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() to return other RET_PF_* as a positive value.
*/
static_assert(RET_PF_CONTINUE == 0);
static inline void kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
{
kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault->gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
PAGE_SIZE, fault->write, fault->exec,
fault->is_private);
}
static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
u64 err, bool prefetch,
int *emulation_type, u8 *level)
{
struct kvm_page_fault fault = {
.addr = cr2_or_gpa,
.error_code = err,
.exec = err & PFERR_FETCH_MASK,
.write = err & PFERR_WRITE_MASK,
.present = err & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK,
.rsvd = err & PFERR_RSVD_MASK,
.user = err & PFERR_USER_MASK,
.prefetch = prefetch,
.is_tdp = likely(vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault == kvm_tdp_page_fault),
.nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled =
is_nx_huge_page_enabled(vcpu->kvm),
.max_level = KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL,
.req_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
.goal_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
.is_private = err & PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS,
.pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT,
};
int r;
if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {
/*
* Things like memslots don't understand the concept of a shared
* bit. Strip it so that the GFN can be used like normal, and the
* fault.addr can be used when the shared bit is needed.
*/
fault.gfn = gpa_to_gfn(fault.addr) & ~kvm_gfn_direct_bits(vcpu->kvm);
fault.slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, fault.gfn);
}
/*
* With retpoline being active an indirect call is rather expensive,
* so do a direct call in the most common case.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
r = kvm_tdp_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
else
r = vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
/*
* Not sure what's happening, but punt to userspace and hope that
* they can fix it by changing memory to shared, or they can
* provide a better error.
*/
if (r == RET_PF_EMULATE && fault.is_private) {
pr_warn_ratelimited("kvm: unexpected emulation request on private memory\n");
kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, &fault);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (fault.write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable && emulation_type)
*emulation_type |= EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP;
if (level)
*level = fault.goal_level;
return r;
}
int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);
void disallowed_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_page_fault *fault, u64 spte, int cur_level);
void track_possible_nx_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
void untrack_possible_nx_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
#endif /* __KVM_X86_MMU_INTERNAL_H */