prysm-pulse/validator/db/kv/genesis.go

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package kv
import (
Make Prysm VC compatible with the version `v5.3.0` of the slashing protections interchange tests. (#13232) * `TestStore_GenesisValidatorsRoot_ReadAndWrite`: Make all test cases independents. In a test with multiple test cases, each test case should be independents. (aka: Removing test case `A` should not impact test case `B`) * `SaveGenesisValidatorsRoot`: Allow to overwrite the genesis validator root if the root is the same. * `ProposalHistoryForSlot`: Add `signingRootExists` Currently, it is not possible with `ProposalHistoryForSlot` to know if a proposal is stored with and `0x00000....` signing root or with an empty signing root. Both cases result to `proposalExists == true` and `signingRoot == 0x00000`. This commit adds a new return boolean: `signingRootExists`. If a proposal has been saved with a `0x00000...` signing root, then: - `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and - `signingRootExists` is set to `true`, and - `signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...` If a proposal has been saved with an empty signing root, then: - `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and - `signingRootExists` is set to `false`, and - (`signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...`) * `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: When importing EIP-3076 Slashing Protection Interchange Format, do not filter any more slashable keys. Note: Those keys are still saved into the black-listed public keys list. There is two reason not to do so: - The EIP-3076 test cases do not know about Prysm's internal black-listed public keys list. Tests will expect, without looking into this internal black-listed public keys list, to deny a further signature. If we filter these keys from the DB (even if we keep them into the black-listed keys list), then some tests will fail. - If we import a interchange file containing slashable keys and we filter them, then, if we re-export the DB, those slashing offences won't appear in the exported interchange file. * `transformSignedBlocks`: Store an 0-len byte slice When importing an EIP-3076 interchange format, and when no signing root is specified into the file, we currently store a `0x00000.....` signing root. In such a case, instead storing `0x00000...`, this commit stores a 0-len byte array, so we can differentiate real `0x000.....` signing root and no signing-root at all. * `slashableProposalCheck`: Manage lack of sign root Currently, `slashableProposalCheck` does not really make a difference between a `0x0000.....` signing root and a missing signing root. (Signing roots can be missing when importing an EIP-3076 interchange file.) This commit differentiate, for `slashableProposalCheck`, `0x0000....` signing root and a missing signing root. * `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot`: ==> `[]byte` When importing attestations from EIP-3076 interchange format, the signing root of an attestation may be missing. Currently, Prysm consider any missing attestation signing root as `0x000...`. However, it may conflict with signing root which really are equal to `0x000...`. This commit transforms `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot` from `[32]byte` to `[]byte`, and change the minimal set of functions (sic) to support this new type. * `CheckSlashableAttestation`: Empty signing root Regarding slashing roots, 2 attestations are slashable, if: - both signing roots are defined and differs, or - one attestation exists, but without a signing root * `filterSlashablePubKeysFromAttestations`: Err sort Rergarding `CheckSlashableAttestation`, we consider that: - If slashable == NotSlashable and err != nil, then CheckSlashableAttestation failed. - If slashable != NotSlashable, then err contains the reason why the attestation is slashable. * `setupEIP3076SpecTests`: Update to `v5.3.0` This commit: - Updates the version of EIP-3076 tests to `v.5.2.1`. - Setups on anti-slashing DB per test case, instead per step. * `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: Reduce cycl cmplxt * `AttestationHistoryForPubKey`: copy signing root BoltDB documentation specifies: | Byte slices returned from Bolt are only valid during a transaction. | Once the transaction has been committed or rolled back then the memory | they point to can be reused by a new page or can be unmapped | from virtual memory and you'll see an unexpected fault address panic | when accessing it.
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"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
bolt "go.etcd.io/bbolt"
)
// SaveGenesisValidatorsRoot saves the genesis validators root to db.
func (s *Store) SaveGenesisValidatorsRoot(_ context.Context, genValRoot []byte) error {
err := s.db.Update(func(tx *bolt.Tx) error {
bkt := tx.Bucket(genesisInfoBucket)
enc := bkt.Get(genesisValidatorsRootKey)
Make Prysm VC compatible with the version `v5.3.0` of the slashing protections interchange tests. (#13232) * `TestStore_GenesisValidatorsRoot_ReadAndWrite`: Make all test cases independents. In a test with multiple test cases, each test case should be independents. (aka: Removing test case `A` should not impact test case `B`) * `SaveGenesisValidatorsRoot`: Allow to overwrite the genesis validator root if the root is the same. * `ProposalHistoryForSlot`: Add `signingRootExists` Currently, it is not possible with `ProposalHistoryForSlot` to know if a proposal is stored with and `0x00000....` signing root or with an empty signing root. Both cases result to `proposalExists == true` and `signingRoot == 0x00000`. This commit adds a new return boolean: `signingRootExists`. If a proposal has been saved with a `0x00000...` signing root, then: - `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and - `signingRootExists` is set to `true`, and - `signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...` If a proposal has been saved with an empty signing root, then: - `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and - `signingRootExists` is set to `false`, and - (`signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...`) * `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: When importing EIP-3076 Slashing Protection Interchange Format, do not filter any more slashable keys. Note: Those keys are still saved into the black-listed public keys list. There is two reason not to do so: - The EIP-3076 test cases do not know about Prysm's internal black-listed public keys list. Tests will expect, without looking into this internal black-listed public keys list, to deny a further signature. If we filter these keys from the DB (even if we keep them into the black-listed keys list), then some tests will fail. - If we import a interchange file containing slashable keys and we filter them, then, if we re-export the DB, those slashing offences won't appear in the exported interchange file. * `transformSignedBlocks`: Store an 0-len byte slice When importing an EIP-3076 interchange format, and when no signing root is specified into the file, we currently store a `0x00000.....` signing root. In such a case, instead storing `0x00000...`, this commit stores a 0-len byte array, so we can differentiate real `0x000.....` signing root and no signing-root at all. * `slashableProposalCheck`: Manage lack of sign root Currently, `slashableProposalCheck` does not really make a difference between a `0x0000.....` signing root and a missing signing root. (Signing roots can be missing when importing an EIP-3076 interchange file.) This commit differentiate, for `slashableProposalCheck`, `0x0000....` signing root and a missing signing root. * `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot`: ==> `[]byte` When importing attestations from EIP-3076 interchange format, the signing root of an attestation may be missing. Currently, Prysm consider any missing attestation signing root as `0x000...`. However, it may conflict with signing root which really are equal to `0x000...`. This commit transforms `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot` from `[32]byte` to `[]byte`, and change the minimal set of functions (sic) to support this new type. * `CheckSlashableAttestation`: Empty signing root Regarding slashing roots, 2 attestations are slashable, if: - both signing roots are defined and differs, or - one attestation exists, but without a signing root * `filterSlashablePubKeysFromAttestations`: Err sort Rergarding `CheckSlashableAttestation`, we consider that: - If slashable == NotSlashable and err != nil, then CheckSlashableAttestation failed. - If slashable != NotSlashable, then err contains the reason why the attestation is slashable. * `setupEIP3076SpecTests`: Update to `v5.3.0` This commit: - Updates the version of EIP-3076 tests to `v.5.2.1`. - Setups on anti-slashing DB per test case, instead per step. * `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: Reduce cycl cmplxt * `AttestationHistoryForPubKey`: copy signing root BoltDB documentation specifies: | Byte slices returned from Bolt are only valid during a transaction. | Once the transaction has been committed or rolled back then the memory | they point to can be reused by a new page or can be unmapped | from virtual memory and you'll see an unexpected fault address panic | when accessing it.
2023-12-04 17:10:32 +00:00
if len(enc) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(enc, genValRoot) {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot overwrite existing genesis validators root: %#x", enc)
}
return bkt.Put(genesisValidatorsRootKey, genValRoot)
})
return err
}
// GenesisValidatorsRoot retrieves the genesis validators root from db.
func (s *Store) GenesisValidatorsRoot(_ context.Context) ([]byte, error) {
var genValRoot []byte
err := s.db.View(func(tx *bolt.Tx) error {
bkt := tx.Bucket(genesisInfoBucket)
enc := bkt.Get(genesisValidatorsRootKey)
if len(enc) == 0 {
return nil
}
genValRoot = enc
return nil
})
return genValRoot, err
}