prysm-pulse/validator/client/propose_protect.go
Manu NALEPA 1112e01c06
Make Prysm VC compatible with the version v5.3.0 of the slashing protections interchange tests. (#13232)
* `TestStore_GenesisValidatorsRoot_ReadAndWrite`: Make all test cases independents.

In a test with multiple test cases, each test case should be independents.
(aka: Removing test case `A` should not impact test case `B`)

* `SaveGenesisValidatorsRoot`: Allow to overwrite the genesis validator root if the root is the same.

* `ProposalHistoryForSlot`: Add `signingRootExists`

Currently, it is not possible with `ProposalHistoryForSlot` to know if a
proposal is stored with and `0x00000....` signing root or with an empty
signing root. Both cases result to `proposalExists == true` and
`signingRoot == 0x00000`.

This commit adds a new return boolean: `signingRootExists`.

If a proposal has been saved with a `0x00000...` signing root, then:
- `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRootExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...`

If a proposal has been saved with an empty signing root, then:
- `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRootExists` is set to `false`, and
- (`signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...`)

* `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: When importing EIP-3076 Slashing Protection Interchange Format, do not filter any more slashable keys.
Note: Those keys are still saved into the black-listed public keys list.

There is two reason not to do so:
- The EIP-3076 test cases do not know about Prysm's internal black-listed public keys list.
  Tests will expect, without looking into this internal black-listed public keys list,
  to deny a further signature. If we filter these keys from the DB (even if we keep them
  into the black-listed keys list), then some tests will fail.
- If we import a interchange file containing slashable keys and we filter them, then,
  if we re-export the DB, those slashing offences won't appear in the exported interchange
  file.

* `transformSignedBlocks`: Store an 0-len byte slice

When importing an EIP-3076 interchange format, and when no
signing root is specified into the file, we currently store a
`0x00000.....` signing root.

In such a case, instead storing `0x00000...`, this commit stores
a 0-len byte array, so we can differentiate real `0x000.....` signing
root and no signing-root at all.

* `slashableProposalCheck`: Manage lack of sign root

Currently, `slashableProposalCheck` does not really make a difference
between a `0x0000.....` signing root and a missing signing root.

(Signing roots can be missing when importing an EIP-3076 interchange
file.)

This commit differentiate, for  `slashableProposalCheck`, `0x0000....`
signing root and a missing signing root.

* `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot`: ==> `[]byte`

When importing attestations from EIP-3076 interchange format,
the signing root of an attestation may be missing.

Currently, Prysm consider any missing attestation signing root as
`0x000...`.
However, it may conflict with signing root which really are equal to
`0x000...`.

This commit transforms `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot` from `[32]byte` to
`[]byte`, and change the minimal set of functions (sic) to support this
new type.

* `CheckSlashableAttestation`: Empty signing root

Regarding slashing roots, 2 attestations are slashable, if:
- both signing roots are defined and differs, or
- one attestation exists, but without a signing root

* `filterSlashablePubKeysFromAttestations`: Err sort

Rergarding `CheckSlashableAttestation`, we consider that:
- If slashable == NotSlashable and err != nil, then CheckSlashableAttestation
failed.
- If slashable != NotSlashable, then err contains the reason why the attestation
is slashable.

* `setupEIP3076SpecTests`: Update to `v5.3.0`

This commit:
- Updates the version of EIP-3076 tests to `v.5.2.1`.
- Setups on anti-slashing DB per test case, instead per step.

* `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: Reduce cycl cmplxt

* `AttestationHistoryForPubKey`: copy signing root

BoltDB documentation specifies:
| Byte slices returned from Bolt are only valid during a transaction.
| Once the transaction has been committed or rolled back then the memory
| they point to can be reused by a new page or can be unmapped
| from virtual memory and you'll see an unexpected fault address panic
| when accessing it.
2023-12-04 17:10:32 +00:00

101 lines
3.7 KiB
Go

package client
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
fieldparams "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/config/fieldparams"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/consensus-types/interfaces"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
var failedBlockSignLocalErr = "attempted to sign a double proposal, block rejected by local protection"
// slashableProposalCheck checks if a block proposal is slashable by comparing it with the
// block proposals history for the given public key in our DB. If it is not, we then update the history
// with new values and save it to the database.
func (v *validator) slashableProposalCheck(
ctx context.Context, pubKey [fieldparams.BLSPubkeyLength]byte, signedBlock interfaces.ReadOnlySignedBeaconBlock, signingRoot [32]byte,
) error {
fmtKey := fmt.Sprintf("%#x", pubKey[:])
blk := signedBlock.Block()
prevSigningRoot, proposalAtSlotExists, prevSigningRootExists, err := v.db.ProposalHistoryForSlot(ctx, pubKey, blk.Slot())
if err != nil {
if v.emitAccountMetrics {
ValidatorProposeFailVec.WithLabelValues(fmtKey).Inc()
}
return errors.Wrap(err, "failed to get proposal history")
}
lowestSignedProposalSlot, lowestProposalExists, err := v.db.LowestSignedProposal(ctx, pubKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Based on EIP-3076 - Condition 2
// -------------------------------
if lowestProposalExists {
// If the block slot is (strictly) less than the lowest signed proposal slot in the DB, we consider it slashable.
if blk.Slot() < lowestSignedProposalSlot {
return fmt.Errorf(
"could not sign block with slot < lowest signed slot in db, block slot: %d < lowest signed slot: %d",
blk.Slot(),
lowestSignedProposalSlot,
)
}
// If the block slot is equal to the lowest signed proposal slot and
// - condition1: there is no signed proposal in the DB for this slot, or
// - condition2: there is a signed proposal in the DB for this slot, but with no associated signing root, or
// - condition3: there is a signed proposal in the DB for this slot, but the signing root differs,
// ==> we consider it slashable.
condition1 := !proposalAtSlotExists
condition2 := proposalAtSlotExists && !prevSigningRootExists
condition3 := proposalAtSlotExists && prevSigningRootExists && prevSigningRoot != signingRoot
if blk.Slot() == lowestSignedProposalSlot && (condition1 || condition2 || condition3) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"could not sign block with slot == lowest signed slot in db if it is not a repeat signing, block slot: %d == slowest signed slot: %d",
blk.Slot(),
lowestSignedProposalSlot,
)
}
}
// Based on EIP-3076 - Condition 1
// -------------------------------
// If there is a signed proposal in the DB for this slot and
// - there is no associated signing root, or
// - the signing root differs,
// ==> we consider it slashable.
if proposalAtSlotExists && (!prevSigningRootExists || prevSigningRoot != signingRoot) {
if v.emitAccountMetrics {
ValidatorProposeFailVec.WithLabelValues(fmtKey).Inc()
}
return errors.New(failedBlockSignLocalErr)
}
// Save the proposal for this slot.
if err := v.db.SaveProposalHistoryForSlot(ctx, pubKey, blk.Slot(), signingRoot[:]); err != nil {
if v.emitAccountMetrics {
ValidatorProposeFailVec.WithLabelValues(fmtKey).Inc()
}
return errors.Wrap(err, "failed to save updated proposal history")
}
return nil
}
func blockLogFields(pubKey [fieldparams.BLSPubkeyLength]byte, blk interfaces.ReadOnlyBeaconBlock, sig []byte) logrus.Fields {
fields := logrus.Fields{
"proposerPublicKey": fmt.Sprintf("%#x", pubKey),
"proposerIndex": blk.ProposerIndex(),
"blockSlot": blk.Slot(),
}
if sig != nil {
fields["signature"] = fmt.Sprintf("%#x", sig)
}
return fields
}