mirror of
https://gitlab.com/pulsechaincom/prysm-pulse.git
synced 2025-01-11 12:10:05 +00:00
58549b95e0
* process receipt root records * complete process pow roots * gazelle * remote print
550 lines
21 KiB
Go
550 lines
21 KiB
Go
package blocks
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import (
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"bytes"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"reflect"
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"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/beacon-chain/core/types"
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v "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/beacon-chain/core/validators"
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pb "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/proto/beacon/p2p/v1"
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"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/shared/params"
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"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/shared/slices"
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)
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// ProcessPOWReceiptRoots processes the proof-of-work chain's receipts
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// contained in a beacon block and appends them as candidate receipt roots
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// in the beacon state.
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//
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// Official spec definition for processing pow receipt roots:
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// If block.candidate_pow_receipt_root is x.candidate_pow_receipt_root
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// for some x in state.candidate_pow_receipt_roots, set x.vote_count += 1.
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// Otherwise, append to state.candidate_pow_receipt_roots a
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// new CandidatePoWReceiptRootRecord(
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// candidate_pow_receipt_root=block.candidate_pow_receipt_root,
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// vote_count=1
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// )
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func ProcessPOWReceiptRoots(
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beaconState *types.BeaconState,
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block *pb.BeaconBlock,
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) []*pb.CandidatePoWReceiptRootRecord {
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var newCandidateReceiptRoots []*pb.CandidatePoWReceiptRootRecord
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currentCandidateReceiptRoots := beaconState.CandidatePowReceiptRoots()
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for idx, root := range currentCandidateReceiptRoots {
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if bytes.Equal(block.GetCandidatePowReceiptRootHash32(), root.GetCandidatePowReceiptRootHash32()) {
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currentCandidateReceiptRoots[idx].Votes++
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} else {
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newCandidateReceiptRoots = append(newCandidateReceiptRoots, &pb.CandidatePoWReceiptRootRecord{
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CandidatePowReceiptRootHash32: block.GetCandidatePowReceiptRootHash32(),
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Votes: 1,
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})
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}
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}
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return append(currentCandidateReceiptRoots, newCandidateReceiptRoots...)
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}
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// ProcessProposerSlashings is one of the operations performed
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// on each processed beacon block to penalize proposers based on
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// slashing conditions if any slashable events occurred.
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//
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// Official spec definition for proposer slashings:
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// Verify that len(block.body.proposer_slashings) <= MAX_PROPOSER_SLASHINGS.
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//
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// For each proposer_slashing in block.body.proposer_slashings:
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//
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// Let proposer = state.validator_registry[proposer_slashing.proposer_index].
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// Verify that bls_verify(pubkey=proposer.pubkey, msg=hash_tree_root(
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// proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1),
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// sig=proposer_slashing.proposal_signature_1,
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// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL)).
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// Verify that bls_verify(pubkey=proposer.pubkey, msg=hash_tree_root(
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// proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2),
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// sig=proposer_slashing.proposal_signature_2,
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// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL)).
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// Verify that proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.slot == proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.slot.
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// Verify that proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.shard == proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.shard.
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// Verify that proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.block_root != proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.block_root.
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// Verify that proposer.status != EXITED_WITH_PENALTY.
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// Run update_validator_status(state, proposer_slashing.proposer_index, new_status=EXITED_WITH_PENALTY).
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func ProcessProposerSlashings(
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validatorRegistry []*pb.ValidatorRecord,
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proposerSlashings []*pb.ProposerSlashing,
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currentSlot uint64,
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) ([]*pb.ValidatorRecord, error) {
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if uint64(len(proposerSlashings)) > params.BeaconConfig().MaxProposerSlashings {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(
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"number of proposer slashings (%d) exceeds allowed threshold of %d",
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len(proposerSlashings),
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params.BeaconConfig().MaxProposerSlashings,
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)
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}
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for idx, slashing := range proposerSlashings {
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if err := verifyProposerSlashing(slashing); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not verify proposer slashing #%d: %v", idx, err)
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}
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proposer := validatorRegistry[slashing.GetProposerIndex()]
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if proposer.Status != pb.ValidatorRecord_EXITED_WITH_PENALTY {
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// TODO(#781): Replace with
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// update_validator_status(
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// state,
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// proposer_slashing.proposer_index,
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// new_status=EXITED_WITH_PENALTY,
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// ) after update_validator_status is implemented.
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validatorRegistry[slashing.GetProposerIndex()] = v.ExitValidator(
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proposer,
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currentSlot,
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true, /* penalize */
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)
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}
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}
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return validatorRegistry, nil
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}
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func verifyProposerSlashing(
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slashing *pb.ProposerSlashing,
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) error {
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// TODO(#258): Verify BLS according to the specification in the "Proposer Slashings"
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// section of block operations.
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slot1 := slashing.GetProposalData_1().GetSlot()
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slot2 := slashing.GetProposalData_2().GetSlot()
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shard1 := slashing.GetProposalData_1().GetShard()
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shard2 := slashing.GetProposalData_2().GetShard()
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root1 := slashing.GetProposalData_1().GetBlockRootHash32()
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root2 := slashing.GetProposalData_2().GetBlockRootHash32()
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if slot1 != slot2 {
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return fmt.Errorf("slashing proposal data slots do not match: %d, %d", slot1, slot2)
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}
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if shard1 != shard2 {
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return fmt.Errorf("slashing proposal data shards do not match: %d, %d", shard1, shard2)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(root1, root2) {
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return fmt.Errorf("slashing proposal data block roots do not match: %#x, %#x", root1, root2)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ProcessCasperSlashings is one of the operations performed
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// on each processed beacon block to penalize validators based on
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// Casper FFG slashing conditions if any slashable events occurred.
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//
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// Official spec definition for casper slashings:
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//
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// Verify that len(block.body.casper_slashings) <= MAX_CASPER_SLASHINGS.
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// For each casper_slashing in block.body.casper_slashings:
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//
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// Verify that verify_casper_votes(state, casper_slashing.votes_1).
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// Verify that verify_casper_votes(state, casper_slashing.votes_2).
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// Verify that casper_slashing.votes_1.data != casper_slashing.votes_2.data.
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// Let indices(vote) = vote.aggregate_signature_poc_0_indices +
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// vote.aggregate_signature_poc_1_indices.
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// Let intersection = [x for x in indices(casper_slashing.votes_1)
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// if x in indices(casper_slashing.votes_2)].
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// Verify that len(intersection) >= 1.
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// Verify the following about the casper votes:
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// (vote1.justified_slot < vote2.justified_slot) &&
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// (vote2.justified_slot + 1 == vote2.slot) &&
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// (vote2.slot < vote1.slot)
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// OR
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// vote1.slot == vote.slot
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// Verify that casper_slashing.votes_1.data.justified_slot + 1 <
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// casper_slashing.votes_2.data.justified_slot + 1 ==
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// casper_slashing.votes_2.data.slot < casper_slashing.votes_1.data.slot
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// or casper_slashing.votes_1.data.slot == casper_slashing.votes_2.data.slot.
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// For each validator index i in intersection,
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// if state.validator_registry[i].status does not equal
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// EXITED_WITH_PENALTY, then run
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// update_validator_status(state, i, new_status=EXITED_WITH_PENALTY)
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func ProcessCasperSlashings(
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validatorRegistry []*pb.ValidatorRecord,
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casperSlashings []*pb.CasperSlashing,
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currentSlot uint64,
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) ([]*pb.ValidatorRecord, error) {
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if uint64(len(casperSlashings)) > params.BeaconConfig().MaxCasperSlashings {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(
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"number of casper slashings (%d) exceeds allowed threshold of %d",
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len(casperSlashings),
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params.BeaconConfig().MaxCasperSlashings,
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)
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}
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for idx, slashing := range casperSlashings {
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if err := verifyCasperSlashing(slashing); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not verify casper slashing #%d: %v", idx, err)
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}
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validatorIndices, err := casperSlashingPenalizedIndices(slashing)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not determine validator indices to penalize: %v", err)
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}
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for _, validatorIndex := range validatorIndices {
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penalizedValidator := validatorRegistry[validatorIndex]
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if penalizedValidator.Status != pb.ValidatorRecord_EXITED_WITH_PENALTY {
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// TODO(#781): Replace with update_validator_status(
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// state,
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// validatorIndex,
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// new_status=EXITED_WITH_PENALTY,
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// ) after update_validator_status is implemented.
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validatorRegistry[validatorIndex] = v.ExitValidator(
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penalizedValidator,
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currentSlot,
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true, /* penalize */
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)
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}
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}
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}
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return validatorRegistry, nil
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}
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func verifyCasperSlashing(slashing *pb.CasperSlashing) error {
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votes1 := slashing.GetVotes_1()
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votes2 := slashing.GetVotes_2()
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votes1Attestation := votes1.GetData()
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votes2Attestation := votes2.GetData()
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if err := verifyCasperVotes(votes1); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("could not verify casper votes 1: %v", err)
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}
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if err := verifyCasperVotes(votes2); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("could not verify casper votes 2: %v", err)
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}
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// Inner attestation data structures for the votes should not be equal,
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// as that would mean both votes are the same and therefore no slashing
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// should occur.
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if reflect.DeepEqual(votes1Attestation, votes2Attestation) {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"casper slashing inner vote attestation data should not match: %v, %v",
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votes1Attestation,
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votes2Attestation,
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)
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}
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// Unless the following holds, the slashing is invalid:
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// (vote1.justified_slot < vote2.justified_slot) &&
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// (vote2.justified_slot + 1 == vote2.slot) &&
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// (vote2.slot < vote1.slot)
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// OR
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// vote1.slot == vote.slot
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justificationValidity := (votes1Attestation.GetJustifiedSlot() < votes2Attestation.GetJustifiedSlot()) &&
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(votes2Attestation.GetJustifiedSlot()+1 == votes2Attestation.GetSlot()) &&
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(votes2Attestation.GetSlot() < votes1Attestation.GetSlot())
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slotsEqual := votes1Attestation.GetSlot() == votes2Attestation.GetSlot()
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if !(justificationValidity || slotsEqual) {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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`
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Expected the following conditions to hold:
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(vote1.JustifiedSlot < vote2.JustifiedSlot) &&
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(vote2.JustifiedSlot + 1 == vote2.Slot) &&
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(vote2.Slot < vote1.Slot)
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OR
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vote1.Slot == vote.Slot
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Instead, received vote1.JustifiedSlot %d, vote2.JustifiedSlot %d
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and vote1.Slot %d, vote2.Slot %d
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`,
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votes1Attestation.GetJustifiedSlot(),
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votes2Attestation.GetJustifiedSlot(),
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votes1Attestation.GetSlot(),
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votes2Attestation.GetSlot(),
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)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func casperSlashingPenalizedIndices(slashing *pb.CasperSlashing) ([]uint32, error) {
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votes1 := slashing.GetVotes_1()
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votes2 := slashing.GetVotes_2()
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votes1Indices := append(
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votes1.GetAggregateSignaturePoc_0Indices(),
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votes1.GetAggregateSignaturePoc_1Indices()...,
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)
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votes2Indices := append(
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votes2.GetAggregateSignaturePoc_0Indices(),
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votes2.GetAggregateSignaturePoc_1Indices()...,
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)
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indicesIntersection := slices.Intersection(votes1Indices, votes2Indices)
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if len(indicesIntersection) < 1 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(
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"expected intersection of vote indices to be non-empty: %v",
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indicesIntersection,
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)
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}
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return indicesIntersection, nil
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}
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func verifyCasperVotes(votes *pb.SlashableVoteData) error {
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totalProofsOfCustody := len(votes.GetAggregateSignaturePoc_0Indices()) +
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len(votes.GetAggregateSignaturePoc_1Indices())
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if uint64(totalProofsOfCustody) > params.BeaconConfig().MaxCasperVotes {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"exceeded allowed casper votes (%d), received %d",
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params.BeaconConfig().MaxCasperVotes,
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totalProofsOfCustody,
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)
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}
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// TODO(#258): Implement BLS verify multiple.
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// pubs = aggregate_pubkeys for each validator in registry for poc0 and poc1
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// indices
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// bls_verify_multiple(
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// pubkeys=pubs,
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// messages=[
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// hash_tree_root(votes)+bytes1(0),
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// hash_tree_root(votes)+bytes1(1),
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// signature=aggregate_signature
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// ]
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// )
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return nil
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}
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// ProcessBlockAttestations applies processing operations to a block's inner attestation
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// records. This function returns a list of pending attestations which can then be
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// appended to the BeaconState's latest attestations.
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//
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// Official spec definition for block attestation processing:
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// Verify that len(block.body.attestations) <= MAX_ATTESTATIONS.
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//
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// For each attestation in block.body.attestations:
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// Verify that attestation.data.slot + MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY <= state.slot.
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// Verify that attestation.data.slot + EPOCH_LENGTH >= state.slot.
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// Verify that attestation.data.justified_slot is equal to
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// state.justified_slot if attestation.data.slot >=
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// state.slot - (state.slot % EPOCH_LENGTH) else state.previous_justified_slot.
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// Verify that attestation.data.justified_block_root is equal to
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// get_block_root(state, attestation.data.justified_slot).
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// Verify that either attestation.data.latest_crosslink_root or
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// attestation.data.shard_block_root equals
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// state.latest_crosslinks[shard].shard_block_root
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// Aggregate_signature verification:
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// Let participants = get_attestation_participants(
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// state,
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// attestation.data,
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// attestation.participation_bitfield,
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// )
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// Let group_public_key = BLSAddPubkeys([
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// state.validator_registry[v].pubkey for v in participants
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// ])
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// Verify that bls_verify(
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// pubkey=group_public_key,
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// message=hash_tree_root(attestation.data) + bytes1(0),
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// signature=attestation.aggregate_signature,
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// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, attestation.data.slot, DOMAIN_ATTESTATION)).
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//
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// [TO BE REMOVED IN PHASE 1] Verify that attestation.data.shard_block_hash == ZERO_HASH.
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// return PendingAttestationRecord(
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// data=attestation.data,
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// participation_bitfield=attestation.participation_bitfield,
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// custody_bitfield=attestation.custody_bitfield,
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// slot_included=state.slot,
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// ) which can then be appended to state.latest_attestations.
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func ProcessBlockAttestations(
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beaconState *types.BeaconState,
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block *pb.BeaconBlock,
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) ([]*pb.PendingAttestationRecord, error) {
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atts := block.GetBody().GetAttestations()
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if uint64(len(atts)) > params.BeaconConfig().MaxAttestations {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(
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"number of attestations in block (%d) exceeds allowed threshold of %d",
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len(atts),
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params.BeaconConfig().MaxAttestations,
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)
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}
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var pendingAttestations []*pb.PendingAttestationRecord
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for idx, attestation := range atts {
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if err := verifyAttestation(beaconState, attestation); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not verify attestation at index %d in block: %v", idx, err)
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}
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pendingAttestations = append(pendingAttestations, &pb.PendingAttestationRecord{
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Data: attestation.GetData(),
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ParticipationBitfield: attestation.GetParticipationBitfield(),
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CustodyBitfield: attestation.GetCustodyBitfield(),
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SlotIncluded: beaconState.Slot(),
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})
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}
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return pendingAttestations, nil
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}
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func verifyAttestation(beaconState *types.BeaconState, att *pb.Attestation) error {
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inclusionDelay := params.BeaconConfig().MinAttestationInclusionDelay
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if att.GetData().GetSlot()+inclusionDelay > beaconState.Slot() {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"attestation slot (slot %d) + inclusion delay (%d) beyond current beacon state slot (%d)",
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att.GetData().GetSlot(),
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inclusionDelay,
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beaconState.Slot(),
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)
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}
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if att.GetData().GetSlot()+params.BeaconConfig().EpochLength < beaconState.Slot() {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"attestation slot (slot %d) + epoch length (%d) less than current beacon state slot (%d)",
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att.GetData().GetSlot(),
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params.BeaconConfig().EpochLength,
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beaconState.Slot(),
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)
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}
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// Verify that attestation.JustifiedSlot is equal to
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// state.JustifiedSlot if attestation.Slot >=
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// state.Slot - (state.Slot % EPOCH_LENGTH) else state.PreviousJustifiedSlot.
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if att.GetData().GetSlot() >= beaconState.Slot()-(beaconState.Slot()%params.BeaconConfig().EpochLength) {
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if att.GetData().GetJustifiedSlot() != beaconState.LastJustifiedSlot() {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"expected attestation.JustifiedSlot == state.JustifiedSlot, received %d == %d",
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att.GetData().GetJustifiedSlot(),
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beaconState.LastJustifiedSlot(),
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)
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}
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} else {
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if att.GetData().GetJustifiedSlot() != beaconState.PreviousJustifiedSlot() {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"expected attestation.JustifiedSlot == state.PreviousJustifiedSlot, received %d == %d",
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att.GetData().GetJustifiedSlot(),
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beaconState.PreviousJustifiedSlot(),
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)
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}
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}
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// Verify that attestation.data.justified_block_root is equal to
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// get_block_root(state, attestation.data.justified_slot).
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blockRoot, err := types.BlockRoot(beaconState.Proto(), att.GetData().GetJustifiedSlot())
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("could not get block root for justified slot: %v", err)
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}
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justifiedBlockRoot := att.GetData().GetJustifiedBlockRootHash32()
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if !bytes.Equal(justifiedBlockRoot, blockRoot) {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"expected JustifiedBlockRoot == getBlockRoot(state, JustifiedSlot): got %#x = %#x",
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justifiedBlockRoot,
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blockRoot,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that either: attestation.data.latest_crosslink_root or
|
|
// attestation.data.shard_block_root equals
|
|
// state.latest_crosslinks[shard].shard_block_root
|
|
crossLinkRoot := att.GetData().GetLatestCrosslinkRootHash32()
|
|
shardBlockRoot := att.GetData().GetShardBlockRootHash32()
|
|
shard := att.GetData().GetShard()
|
|
stateShardBlockRoot := beaconState.LatestCrosslinks()[shard].GetShardBlockRootHash32()
|
|
|
|
if !(bytes.Equal(crossLinkRoot, stateShardBlockRoot) ||
|
|
bytes.Equal(shardBlockRoot, stateShardBlockRoot)) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"attestation.CrossLinkRoot and ShardBlockRoot != %v (state.LatestCrosslinks' ShardBlockRoot)",
|
|
stateShardBlockRoot,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify attestation.shard_block_root == ZERO_HASH [TO BE REMOVED IN PHASE 1].
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(att.GetData().GetShardBlockRootHash32(), []byte{}) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"expected attestation.ShardBlockRoot == %#x, received %#x instead",
|
|
[]byte{},
|
|
att.GetData().GetShardBlockRootHash32(),
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
// TODO(#258): Integrate BLS signature verification for attestation.
|
|
// Let participants = get_attestation_participants(
|
|
// state,
|
|
// attestation.data,
|
|
// attestation.participation_bitfield,
|
|
// )
|
|
// Let group_public_key = BLSAddPubkeys([
|
|
// state.validator_registry[v].pubkey for v in participants
|
|
// ])
|
|
// Verify that bls_verify(
|
|
// pubkey=group_public_key,
|
|
// message=hash_tree_root(attestation.data) + bytes1(0),
|
|
// signature=attestation.aggregate_signature,
|
|
// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, attestation.data.slot, DOMAIN_ATTESTATION)).
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ProcessValidatorExits is one of the operations performed
|
|
// on each processed beacon block to determine which validators
|
|
// should exit the state's validator registry.
|
|
//
|
|
// Official spec definition for processing exits:
|
|
//
|
|
// Verify that len(block.body.exits) <= MAX_EXITS.
|
|
//
|
|
// For each exit in block.body.exits:
|
|
// Let validator = state.validator_registry[exit.validator_index].
|
|
// Verify that validator.status == ACTIVE.
|
|
// Verify that state.slot >= exit.slot.
|
|
// Verify that state.slot >= validator.latest_status_change_slot +
|
|
// SHARD_PERSISTENT_COMMITTEE_CHANGE_PERIOD.
|
|
// Verify that bls_verify(
|
|
// pubkey=validator.pubkey,
|
|
// message=ZERO_HASH,
|
|
// signature=exit.signature,
|
|
// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, exit.slot, DOMAIN_EXIT),
|
|
// )
|
|
// Run update_validator_status(
|
|
// state, exit.validator_index, new_status=ACTIVE_PENDING_EXIT,
|
|
// )
|
|
func ProcessValidatorExits(
|
|
beaconState *types.BeaconState,
|
|
block *pb.BeaconBlock,
|
|
) ([]*pb.ValidatorRecord, error) {
|
|
exits := block.GetBody().GetExits()
|
|
if uint64(len(exits)) > params.BeaconConfig().MaxExits {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"number of exits (%d) exceeds allowed threshold of %d",
|
|
len(exits),
|
|
params.BeaconConfig().MaxExits,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
validatorRegistry := beaconState.ValidatorRegistry()
|
|
for idx, exit := range exits {
|
|
if err := verifyExit(beaconState, exit); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not verify exit #%d: %v", idx, err)
|
|
}
|
|
// TODO(#781): Replace with update_validator_status(
|
|
// state,
|
|
// validatorIndex,
|
|
// new_status=ACTIVE_PENDING_EXIT,
|
|
// ) after update_validator_status is implemented.
|
|
validator := validatorRegistry[exit.GetValidatorIndex()]
|
|
validatorRegistry[exit.GetValidatorIndex()] = v.ExitValidator(
|
|
validator,
|
|
beaconState.Slot(),
|
|
true, /* penalize */
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
return validatorRegistry, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func verifyExit(beaconState *types.BeaconState, exit *pb.Exit) error {
|
|
validator := beaconState.ValidatorRegistry()[exit.GetValidatorIndex()]
|
|
if validator.GetStatus() != pb.ValidatorRecord_ACTIVE {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"expected validator to have active status, received %v",
|
|
validator.GetStatus(),
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
if beaconState.Slot() < exit.GetSlot() {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"expected state.Slot >= exit.Slot, received %d < %d",
|
|
beaconState.Slot(),
|
|
exit.GetSlot(),
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
persistentCommitteeSlot := validator.GetLatestStatusChangeSlot() +
|
|
params.BeaconConfig().ShardPersistentCommitteeChangePeriod
|
|
if beaconState.Slot() < persistentCommitteeSlot {
|
|
return errors.New(
|
|
"expected validator.LatestStatusChangeSlot + PersistentCommitteePeriod >= state.Slot",
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
// TODO(#258): Verify using BLS signature verification below:
|
|
// Verify that bls_verify(
|
|
// pubkey=validator.pubkey,
|
|
// message=ZERO_HASH,
|
|
// signature=exit.signature,
|
|
// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, exit.slot, DOMAIN_EXIT),
|
|
// )
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|