prysm-pulse/beacon-chain/slasher/helpers.go
terence 5a66807989
Update to V5 (#13622)
* First take at updating everything to v5

* Patch gRPC gateway to use prysm v5

Fix patch

* Update go ssz

---------

Co-authored-by: Preston Van Loon <pvanloon@offchainlabs.com>
2024-02-15 05:46:47 +00:00

162 lines
6.0 KiB
Go

package slasher
import (
"bytes"
"strconv"
slashertypes "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v5/beacon-chain/slasher/types"
fieldparams "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v5/config/fieldparams"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v5/config/params"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v5/consensus-types/primitives"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v5/container/slice"
ethpb "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v5/proto/prysm/v1alpha1"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
// Group a list of attestations into batches by validator chunk index.
// This way, we can detect on the batch of attestations for each validator chunk index
// concurrently, and also allowing us to effectively use a single 2D chunk
// for slashing detection through this logical grouping.
func (s *Service) groupByValidatorChunkIndex(
attestations []*slashertypes.IndexedAttestationWrapper,
) map[uint64][]*slashertypes.IndexedAttestationWrapper {
groupedAttestations := make(map[uint64][]*slashertypes.IndexedAttestationWrapper)
for _, attestation := range attestations {
validatorChunkIndexes := make(map[uint64]bool)
for _, validatorIndex := range attestation.IndexedAttestation.AttestingIndices {
validatorChunkIndex := s.params.validatorChunkIndex(primitives.ValidatorIndex(validatorIndex))
validatorChunkIndexes[validatorChunkIndex] = true
}
for validatorChunkIndex := range validatorChunkIndexes {
groupedAttestations[validatorChunkIndex] = append(
groupedAttestations[validatorChunkIndex],
attestation,
)
}
}
return groupedAttestations
}
// Group attestations by the chunk index their source epoch corresponds to.
func (s *Service) groupByChunkIndex(
attestations []*slashertypes.IndexedAttestationWrapper,
) map[uint64][]*slashertypes.IndexedAttestationWrapper {
attestationsByChunkIndex := make(map[uint64][]*slashertypes.IndexedAttestationWrapper)
for _, attestation := range attestations {
chunkIndex := s.params.chunkIndex(attestation.IndexedAttestation.Data.Source.Epoch)
attestationsByChunkIndex[chunkIndex] = append(attestationsByChunkIndex[chunkIndex], attestation)
}
return attestationsByChunkIndex
}
// This function returns a list of valid attestations, a list of attestations that are
// valid in the future, and the number of attestations dropped.
func (s *Service) filterAttestations(
attWrappers []*slashertypes.IndexedAttestationWrapper, currentEpoch primitives.Epoch,
) (valid, validInFuture []*slashertypes.IndexedAttestationWrapper, numDropped int) {
valid = make([]*slashertypes.IndexedAttestationWrapper, 0, len(attWrappers))
validInFuture = make([]*slashertypes.IndexedAttestationWrapper, 0, len(attWrappers))
for _, attWrapper := range attWrappers {
if attWrapper == nil || !validateAttestationIntegrity(attWrapper.IndexedAttestation) {
numDropped++
continue
}
// If an attestation's source is epoch is older than the max history length
// we keep track of for slashing detection, we drop it.
if attWrapper.IndexedAttestation.Data.Source.Epoch+s.params.historyLength <= currentEpoch {
numDropped++
continue
}
// If an attestations's target epoch is in the future, we defer processing for later.
if attWrapper.IndexedAttestation.Data.Target.Epoch > currentEpoch {
validInFuture = append(validInFuture, attWrapper)
continue
}
// The attestation is valid.
valid = append(valid, attWrapper)
}
return
}
// Validates the attestation data integrity, ensuring we have no nil values for
// source and target epochs, and that the source epoch of the attestation must
// be less than the target epoch, which is a precondition for performing slashing
// detection (except for the genesis epoch).
func validateAttestationIntegrity(att *ethpb.IndexedAttestation) bool {
// If an attestation is malformed, we drop it.
if att == nil ||
att.Data == nil ||
att.Data.Source == nil ||
att.Data.Target == nil {
return false
}
sourceEpoch := att.Data.Source.Epoch
targetEpoch := att.Data.Target.Epoch
// The genesis epoch is a special case, since all attestations formed in it
// will have source and target 0, and they should be considered valid.
if sourceEpoch == 0 && targetEpoch == 0 {
return true
}
// All valid attestations must have source epoch < target epoch.
return sourceEpoch < targetEpoch
}
// Validates the signed beacon block header integrity, ensuring we have no nil values.
func validateBlockHeaderIntegrity(header *ethpb.SignedBeaconBlockHeader) bool {
// If a signed block header is malformed, we drop it.
if header == nil ||
header.Header == nil ||
len(header.Signature) != fieldparams.BLSSignatureLength ||
bytes.Equal(header.Signature, make([]byte, fieldparams.BLSSignatureLength)) {
return false
}
return true
}
func logAttesterSlashing(slashing *ethpb.AttesterSlashing) {
indices := slice.IntersectionUint64(slashing.Attestation_1.AttestingIndices, slashing.Attestation_2.AttestingIndices)
log.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"validatorIndex": indices,
"prevSourceEpoch": slashing.Attestation_1.Data.Source.Epoch,
"prevTargetEpoch": slashing.Attestation_1.Data.Target.Epoch,
"sourceEpoch": slashing.Attestation_2.Data.Source.Epoch,
"targetEpoch": slashing.Attestation_2.Data.Target.Epoch,
}).Info("Attester slashing detected")
}
func logProposerSlashing(slashing *ethpb.ProposerSlashing) {
log.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"validatorIndex": slashing.Header_1.Header.ProposerIndex,
"slot": slashing.Header_1.Header.Slot,
}).Info("Proposer slashing detected")
}
// Turns a uint64 value to a string representation.
func uintToString(val uint64) string {
return strconv.FormatUint(val, 10)
}
// If an existing signing root does not match an incoming proposal signing root,
// we then have a double block proposer slashing event.
func isDoubleProposal(incomingSigningRoot, existingSigningRoot [32]byte) bool {
// If the existing signing root is the zero hash, we do not consider
// this a double proposal.
if existingSigningRoot == params.BeaconConfig().ZeroHash {
return false
}
return incomingSigningRoot != existingSigningRoot
}