prysm-pulse/validator/client/attest_protect.go
Manu NALEPA 1112e01c06
Make Prysm VC compatible with the version v5.3.0 of the slashing protections interchange tests. (#13232)
* `TestStore_GenesisValidatorsRoot_ReadAndWrite`: Make all test cases independents.

In a test with multiple test cases, each test case should be independents.
(aka: Removing test case `A` should not impact test case `B`)

* `SaveGenesisValidatorsRoot`: Allow to overwrite the genesis validator root if the root is the same.

* `ProposalHistoryForSlot`: Add `signingRootExists`

Currently, it is not possible with `ProposalHistoryForSlot` to know if a
proposal is stored with and `0x00000....` signing root or with an empty
signing root. Both cases result to `proposalExists == true` and
`signingRoot == 0x00000`.

This commit adds a new return boolean: `signingRootExists`.

If a proposal has been saved with a `0x00000...` signing root, then:
- `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRootExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...`

If a proposal has been saved with an empty signing root, then:
- `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRootExists` is set to `false`, and
- (`signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...`)

* `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: When importing EIP-3076 Slashing Protection Interchange Format, do not filter any more slashable keys.
Note: Those keys are still saved into the black-listed public keys list.

There is two reason not to do so:
- The EIP-3076 test cases do not know about Prysm's internal black-listed public keys list.
  Tests will expect, without looking into this internal black-listed public keys list,
  to deny a further signature. If we filter these keys from the DB (even if we keep them
  into the black-listed keys list), then some tests will fail.
- If we import a interchange file containing slashable keys and we filter them, then,
  if we re-export the DB, those slashing offences won't appear in the exported interchange
  file.

* `transformSignedBlocks`: Store an 0-len byte slice

When importing an EIP-3076 interchange format, and when no
signing root is specified into the file, we currently store a
`0x00000.....` signing root.

In such a case, instead storing `0x00000...`, this commit stores
a 0-len byte array, so we can differentiate real `0x000.....` signing
root and no signing-root at all.

* `slashableProposalCheck`: Manage lack of sign root

Currently, `slashableProposalCheck` does not really make a difference
between a `0x0000.....` signing root and a missing signing root.

(Signing roots can be missing when importing an EIP-3076 interchange
file.)

This commit differentiate, for  `slashableProposalCheck`, `0x0000....`
signing root and a missing signing root.

* `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot`: ==> `[]byte`

When importing attestations from EIP-3076 interchange format,
the signing root of an attestation may be missing.

Currently, Prysm consider any missing attestation signing root as
`0x000...`.
However, it may conflict with signing root which really are equal to
`0x000...`.

This commit transforms `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot` from `[32]byte` to
`[]byte`, and change the minimal set of functions (sic) to support this
new type.

* `CheckSlashableAttestation`: Empty signing root

Regarding slashing roots, 2 attestations are slashable, if:
- both signing roots are defined and differs, or
- one attestation exists, but without a signing root

* `filterSlashablePubKeysFromAttestations`: Err sort

Rergarding `CheckSlashableAttestation`, we consider that:
- If slashable == NotSlashable and err != nil, then CheckSlashableAttestation
failed.
- If slashable != NotSlashable, then err contains the reason why the attestation
is slashable.

* `setupEIP3076SpecTests`: Update to `v5.3.0`

This commit:
- Updates the version of EIP-3076 tests to `v.5.2.1`.
- Setups on anti-slashing DB per test case, instead per step.

* `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: Reduce cycl cmplxt

* `AttestationHistoryForPubKey`: copy signing root

BoltDB documentation specifies:
| Byte slices returned from Bolt are only valid during a transaction.
| Once the transaction has been committed or rolled back then the memory
| they point to can be reused by a new page or can be unmapped
| from virtual memory and you'll see an unexpected fault address panic
| when accessing it.
2023-12-04 17:10:32 +00:00

87 lines
3.0 KiB
Go
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters

This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.

package client
import (
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
fieldparams "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/config/fieldparams"
ethpb "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/proto/prysm/v1alpha1"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/proto/prysm/v1alpha1/slashings"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/validator/db/kv"
"go.opencensus.io/trace"
)
var failedAttLocalProtectionErr = "attempted to make slashable attestation, rejected by local slashing protection"
// Checks if an attestation is slashable by comparing it with the attesting
// history for the given public key in our DB. If it is not, we then update the history
// with new values and save it to the database.
func (v *validator) slashableAttestationCheck(
ctx context.Context,
indexedAtt *ethpb.IndexedAttestation,
pubKey [fieldparams.BLSPubkeyLength]byte,
signingRoot32 [32]byte,
) error {
ctx, span := trace.StartSpan(ctx, "validator.postAttSignUpdate")
defer span.End()
signingRoot := signingRoot32[:]
// Based on EIP3076, validator should refuse to sign any attestation with source epoch less
// than the minimum source epoch present in that signers attestations.
lowestSourceEpoch, exists, err := v.db.LowestSignedSourceEpoch(ctx, pubKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if exists && indexedAtt.Data.Source.Epoch < lowestSourceEpoch {
return fmt.Errorf(
"could not sign attestation lower than lowest source epoch in db, %d < %d",
indexedAtt.Data.Source.Epoch,
lowestSourceEpoch,
)
}
existingSigningRoot, err := v.db.SigningRootAtTargetEpoch(ctx, pubKey, indexedAtt.Data.Target.Epoch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
signingRootsDiffer := slashings.SigningRootsDiffer(existingSigningRoot, signingRoot)
// Based on EIP3076, validator should refuse to sign any attestation with target epoch less
// than or equal to the minimum target epoch present in that signers attestations.
lowestTargetEpoch, exists, err := v.db.LowestSignedTargetEpoch(ctx, pubKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if signingRootsDiffer && exists && indexedAtt.Data.Target.Epoch <= lowestTargetEpoch {
return fmt.Errorf(
"could not sign attestation lower than or equal to lowest target epoch in db, %d <= %d",
indexedAtt.Data.Target.Epoch,
lowestTargetEpoch,
)
}
fmtKey := "0x" + hex.EncodeToString(pubKey[:])
slashingKind, err := v.db.CheckSlashableAttestation(ctx, pubKey, signingRoot, indexedAtt)
if err != nil {
if v.emitAccountMetrics {
ValidatorAttestFailVec.WithLabelValues(fmtKey).Inc()
}
switch slashingKind {
case kv.DoubleVote:
log.Warn("Attestation is slashable as it is a double vote")
case kv.SurroundingVote:
log.Warn("Attestation is slashable as it is surrounding a previous attestation")
case kv.SurroundedVote:
log.Warn("Attestation is slashable as it is surrounded by a previous attestation")
}
return errors.Wrap(err, failedAttLocalProtectionErr)
}
if err := v.db.SaveAttestationForPubKey(ctx, pubKey, signingRoot32, indexedAtt); err != nil {
return errors.Wrap(err, "could not save attestation history for validator public key")
}
return nil
}