prysm-pulse/validator/client/propose_protect_test.go
Manu NALEPA 1112e01c06
Make Prysm VC compatible with the version v5.3.0 of the slashing protections interchange tests. (#13232)
* `TestStore_GenesisValidatorsRoot_ReadAndWrite`: Make all test cases independents.

In a test with multiple test cases, each test case should be independents.
(aka: Removing test case `A` should not impact test case `B`)

* `SaveGenesisValidatorsRoot`: Allow to overwrite the genesis validator root if the root is the same.

* `ProposalHistoryForSlot`: Add `signingRootExists`

Currently, it is not possible with `ProposalHistoryForSlot` to know if a
proposal is stored with and `0x00000....` signing root or with an empty
signing root. Both cases result to `proposalExists == true` and
`signingRoot == 0x00000`.

This commit adds a new return boolean: `signingRootExists`.

If a proposal has been saved with a `0x00000...` signing root, then:
- `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRootExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...`

If a proposal has been saved with an empty signing root, then:
- `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRootExists` is set to `false`, and
- (`signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...`)

* `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: When importing EIP-3076 Slashing Protection Interchange Format, do not filter any more slashable keys.
Note: Those keys are still saved into the black-listed public keys list.

There is two reason not to do so:
- The EIP-3076 test cases do not know about Prysm's internal black-listed public keys list.
  Tests will expect, without looking into this internal black-listed public keys list,
  to deny a further signature. If we filter these keys from the DB (even if we keep them
  into the black-listed keys list), then some tests will fail.
- If we import a interchange file containing slashable keys and we filter them, then,
  if we re-export the DB, those slashing offences won't appear in the exported interchange
  file.

* `transformSignedBlocks`: Store an 0-len byte slice

When importing an EIP-3076 interchange format, and when no
signing root is specified into the file, we currently store a
`0x00000.....` signing root.

In such a case, instead storing `0x00000...`, this commit stores
a 0-len byte array, so we can differentiate real `0x000.....` signing
root and no signing-root at all.

* `slashableProposalCheck`: Manage lack of sign root

Currently, `slashableProposalCheck` does not really make a difference
between a `0x0000.....` signing root and a missing signing root.

(Signing roots can be missing when importing an EIP-3076 interchange
file.)

This commit differentiate, for  `slashableProposalCheck`, `0x0000....`
signing root and a missing signing root.

* `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot`: ==> `[]byte`

When importing attestations from EIP-3076 interchange format,
the signing root of an attestation may be missing.

Currently, Prysm consider any missing attestation signing root as
`0x000...`.
However, it may conflict with signing root which really are equal to
`0x000...`.

This commit transforms `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot` from `[32]byte` to
`[]byte`, and change the minimal set of functions (sic) to support this
new type.

* `CheckSlashableAttestation`: Empty signing root

Regarding slashing roots, 2 attestations are slashable, if:
- both signing roots are defined and differs, or
- one attestation exists, but without a signing root

* `filterSlashablePubKeysFromAttestations`: Err sort

Rergarding `CheckSlashableAttestation`, we consider that:
- If slashable == NotSlashable and err != nil, then CheckSlashableAttestation
failed.
- If slashable != NotSlashable, then err contains the reason why the attestation
is slashable.

* `setupEIP3076SpecTests`: Update to `v5.3.0`

This commit:
- Updates the version of EIP-3076 tests to `v.5.2.1`.
- Setups on anti-slashing DB per test case, instead per step.

* `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: Reduce cycl cmplxt

* `AttestationHistoryForPubKey`: copy signing root

BoltDB documentation specifies:
| Byte slices returned from Bolt are only valid during a transaction.
| Once the transaction has been committed or rolled back then the memory
| they point to can be reused by a new page or can be unmapped
| from virtual memory and you'll see an unexpected fault address panic
| when accessing it.
2023-12-04 17:10:32 +00:00

156 lines
5.8 KiB
Go

package client
import (
"context"
"testing"
fieldparams "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/config/fieldparams"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/config/params"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/consensus-types/blocks"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/consensus-types/primitives"
ethpb "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/proto/prysm/v1alpha1"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/testing/require"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/testing/util"
)
func Test_slashableProposalCheck_PreventsLowerThanMinProposal(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
validator, _, validatorKey, finish := setup(t)
defer finish()
lowestSignedSlot := primitives.Slot(10)
var pubKeyBytes [fieldparams.BLSPubkeyLength]byte
copy(pubKeyBytes[:], validatorKey.PublicKey().Marshal())
// We save a proposal at the lowest signed slot in the DB.
err := validator.db.SaveProposalHistoryForSlot(ctx, pubKeyBytes, lowestSignedSlot, []byte{1})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, err)
// We expect the same block with a slot lower than the lowest
// signed slot to fail validation.
blk := &ethpb.SignedBeaconBlock{
Block: &ethpb.BeaconBlock{
Slot: lowestSignedSlot - 1,
ProposerIndex: 0,
Body: &ethpb.BeaconBlockBody{},
},
Signature: params.BeaconConfig().EmptySignature[:],
}
wsb, err := blocks.NewSignedBeaconBlock(blk)
require.NoError(t, err)
err = validator.slashableProposalCheck(context.Background(), pubKeyBytes, wsb, [32]byte{4})
require.ErrorContains(t, "could not sign block with slot < lowest signed", err)
// We expect the same block with a slot equal to the lowest
// signed slot to pass validation if signing roots are equal.
blk = &ethpb.SignedBeaconBlock{
Block: &ethpb.BeaconBlock{
Slot: lowestSignedSlot,
ProposerIndex: 0,
Body: &ethpb.BeaconBlockBody{},
},
Signature: params.BeaconConfig().EmptySignature[:],
}
wsb, err = blocks.NewSignedBeaconBlock(blk)
require.NoError(t, err)
err = validator.slashableProposalCheck(context.Background(), pubKeyBytes, wsb, [32]byte{1})
require.NoError(t, err)
// We expect the same block with a slot equal to the lowest
// signed slot to fail validation if signing roots are different.
wsb, err = blocks.NewSignedBeaconBlock(blk)
require.NoError(t, err)
err = validator.slashableProposalCheck(context.Background(), pubKeyBytes, wsb, [32]byte{4})
require.ErrorContains(t, "could not sign block with slot == lowest signed", err)
// We expect the same block with a slot > than the lowest
// signed slot to pass validation.
blk = &ethpb.SignedBeaconBlock{
Block: &ethpb.BeaconBlock{
Slot: lowestSignedSlot + 1,
ProposerIndex: 0,
Body: &ethpb.BeaconBlockBody{},
},
Signature: params.BeaconConfig().EmptySignature[:],
}
wsb, err = blocks.NewSignedBeaconBlock(blk)
require.NoError(t, err)
err = validator.slashableProposalCheck(context.Background(), pubKeyBytes, wsb, [32]byte{3})
require.NoError(t, err)
}
func Test_slashableProposalCheck(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
validator, _, validatorKey, finish := setup(t)
defer finish()
blk := util.HydrateSignedBeaconBlock(&ethpb.SignedBeaconBlock{
Block: &ethpb.BeaconBlock{
Slot: 10,
ProposerIndex: 0,
Body: &ethpb.BeaconBlockBody{},
},
Signature: params.BeaconConfig().EmptySignature[:],
})
var pubKeyBytes [fieldparams.BLSPubkeyLength]byte
copy(pubKeyBytes[:], validatorKey.PublicKey().Marshal())
// We save a proposal at slot 1 as our lowest proposal.
err := validator.db.SaveProposalHistoryForSlot(ctx, pubKeyBytes, 1, []byte{1})
require.NoError(t, err)
// We save a proposal at slot 10 with a dummy signing root.
dummySigningRoot := [32]byte{1}
err = validator.db.SaveProposalHistoryForSlot(ctx, pubKeyBytes, 10, dummySigningRoot[:])
require.NoError(t, err)
var pubKey [fieldparams.BLSPubkeyLength]byte
copy(pubKey[:], validatorKey.PublicKey().Marshal())
sBlock, err := blocks.NewSignedBeaconBlock(blk)
require.NoError(t, err)
// We expect the same block sent out with the same root should not be slasahble.
err = validator.slashableProposalCheck(context.Background(), pubKey, sBlock, dummySigningRoot)
require.NoError(t, err)
// We expect the same block sent out with a different signing root should be slasahble.
err = validator.slashableProposalCheck(context.Background(), pubKey, sBlock, [32]byte{2})
require.ErrorContains(t, failedBlockSignLocalErr, err)
// We save a proposal at slot 11 with a nil signing root.
blk.Block.Slot = 11
sBlock, err = blocks.NewSignedBeaconBlock(blk)
require.NoError(t, err)
err = validator.db.SaveProposalHistoryForSlot(ctx, pubKeyBytes, blk.Block.Slot, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
// We expect the same block sent out should return slashable error even
// if we had a nil signing root stored in the database.
err = validator.slashableProposalCheck(context.Background(), pubKey, sBlock, [32]byte{2})
require.ErrorContains(t, failedBlockSignLocalErr, err)
// A block with a different slot for which we do not have a proposing history
// should not be failing validation.
blk.Block.Slot = 9
sBlock, err = blocks.NewSignedBeaconBlock(blk)
require.NoError(t, err)
err = validator.slashableProposalCheck(context.Background(), pubKey, sBlock, [32]byte{3})
require.NoError(t, err, "Expected allowed block not to throw error")
}
func Test_slashableProposalCheck_RemoteProtection(t *testing.T) {
validator, _, validatorKey, finish := setup(t)
defer finish()
var pubKey [fieldparams.BLSPubkeyLength]byte
copy(pubKey[:], validatorKey.PublicKey().Marshal())
blk := util.NewBeaconBlock()
blk.Block.Slot = 10
sBlock, err := blocks.NewSignedBeaconBlock(blk)
require.NoError(t, err)
err = validator.slashableProposalCheck(context.Background(), pubKey, sBlock, [32]byte{2})
require.NoError(t, err, "Expected allowed block not to throw error")
}