prysm-pulse/validator/slashing-protection-history/export.go
Manu NALEPA 1112e01c06
Make Prysm VC compatible with the version v5.3.0 of the slashing protections interchange tests. (#13232)
* `TestStore_GenesisValidatorsRoot_ReadAndWrite`: Make all test cases independents.

In a test with multiple test cases, each test case should be independents.
(aka: Removing test case `A` should not impact test case `B`)

* `SaveGenesisValidatorsRoot`: Allow to overwrite the genesis validator root if the root is the same.

* `ProposalHistoryForSlot`: Add `signingRootExists`

Currently, it is not possible with `ProposalHistoryForSlot` to know if a
proposal is stored with and `0x00000....` signing root or with an empty
signing root. Both cases result to `proposalExists == true` and
`signingRoot == 0x00000`.

This commit adds a new return boolean: `signingRootExists`.

If a proposal has been saved with a `0x00000...` signing root, then:
- `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRootExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...`

If a proposal has been saved with an empty signing root, then:
- `proposalExists` is set to `true`, and
- `signingRootExists` is set to `false`, and
- (`signingRoot` is set to `0x00000...`)

* `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: When importing EIP-3076 Slashing Protection Interchange Format, do not filter any more slashable keys.
Note: Those keys are still saved into the black-listed public keys list.

There is two reason not to do so:
- The EIP-3076 test cases do not know about Prysm's internal black-listed public keys list.
  Tests will expect, without looking into this internal black-listed public keys list,
  to deny a further signature. If we filter these keys from the DB (even if we keep them
  into the black-listed keys list), then some tests will fail.
- If we import a interchange file containing slashable keys and we filter them, then,
  if we re-export the DB, those slashing offences won't appear in the exported interchange
  file.

* `transformSignedBlocks`: Store an 0-len byte slice

When importing an EIP-3076 interchange format, and when no
signing root is specified into the file, we currently store a
`0x00000.....` signing root.

In such a case, instead storing `0x00000...`, this commit stores
a 0-len byte array, so we can differentiate real `0x000.....` signing
root and no signing-root at all.

* `slashableProposalCheck`: Manage lack of sign root

Currently, `slashableProposalCheck` does not really make a difference
between a `0x0000.....` signing root and a missing signing root.

(Signing roots can be missing when importing an EIP-3076 interchange
file.)

This commit differentiate, for  `slashableProposalCheck`, `0x0000....`
signing root and a missing signing root.

* `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot`: ==> `[]byte`

When importing attestations from EIP-3076 interchange format,
the signing root of an attestation may be missing.

Currently, Prysm consider any missing attestation signing root as
`0x000...`.
However, it may conflict with signing root which really are equal to
`0x000...`.

This commit transforms `AttestationRecord.SigningRoot` from `[32]byte` to
`[]byte`, and change the minimal set of functions (sic) to support this
new type.

* `CheckSlashableAttestation`: Empty signing root

Regarding slashing roots, 2 attestations are slashable, if:
- both signing roots are defined and differs, or
- one attestation exists, but without a signing root

* `filterSlashablePubKeysFromAttestations`: Err sort

Rergarding `CheckSlashableAttestation`, we consider that:
- If slashable == NotSlashable and err != nil, then CheckSlashableAttestation
failed.
- If slashable != NotSlashable, then err contains the reason why the attestation
is slashable.

* `setupEIP3076SpecTests`: Update to `v5.3.0`

This commit:
- Updates the version of EIP-3076 tests to `v.5.2.1`.
- Setups on anti-slashing DB per test case, instead per step.

* `ImportStandardProtectionJSON`: Reduce cycl cmplxt

* `AttestationHistoryForPubKey`: copy signing root

BoltDB documentation specifies:
| Byte slices returned from Bolt are only valid during a transaction.
| Once the transaction has been committed or rolled back then the memory
| they point to can be reused by a new page or can be unmapped
| from virtual memory and you'll see an unexpected fault address panic
| when accessing it.
2023-12-04 17:10:32 +00:00

199 lines
7.4 KiB
Go

package history
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sort"
"strings"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
fieldparams "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/config/fieldparams"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/encoding/bytesutil"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/monitoring/progress"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/validator/db"
"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/v4/validator/slashing-protection-history/format"
)
// ExportStandardProtectionJSON extracts all slashing protection data from a validator database
// and packages it into an EIP-3076 compliant, standard
func ExportStandardProtectionJSON(
ctx context.Context,
validatorDB db.Database,
filteredKeys ...[]byte,
) (*format.EIPSlashingProtectionFormat, error) {
interchangeJSON := &format.EIPSlashingProtectionFormat{}
genesisValidatorsRoot, err := validatorDB.GenesisValidatorsRoot(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "could not get genesis validators root from DB")
}
if genesisValidatorsRoot == nil || !bytesutil.IsValidRoot(genesisValidatorsRoot) {
return nil, errors.New(
"genesis validators root is empty, perhaps you are not connected to your beacon node",
)
}
genesisRootHex, err := rootToHexString(genesisValidatorsRoot)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "could not convert genesis validators root to hex string")
}
interchangeJSON.Metadata.GenesisValidatorsRoot = genesisRootHex
interchangeJSON.Metadata.InterchangeFormatVersion = format.InterchangeFormatVersion
// Allow for filtering data for the keys we wish to export.
filteredKeysMap := make(map[string]bool, len(filteredKeys))
for _, k := range filteredKeys {
filteredKeysMap[string(k)] = true
}
// Extract the existing public keys in our database.
proposedPublicKeys, err := validatorDB.ProposedPublicKeys(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "could not retrieve proposer public keys from DB")
}
attestedPublicKeys, err := validatorDB.AttestedPublicKeys(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "could not retrieve attested public keys from DB")
}
dataByPubKey := make(map[[fieldparams.BLSPubkeyLength]byte]*format.ProtectionData)
// Extract the signed proposals by public key.
bar := progress.InitializeProgressBar(
len(proposedPublicKeys), "Extracting signed blocks by validator public key",
)
for _, pubKey := range proposedPublicKeys {
if _, ok := filteredKeysMap[string(pubKey[:])]; len(filteredKeys) > 0 && !ok {
continue
}
pubKeyHex, err := pubKeyToHexString(pubKey[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "could not convert public key to hex string")
}
signedBlocks, err := signedBlocksByPubKey(ctx, validatorDB, pubKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "could not retrieve signed blocks for public key %s", pubKeyHex)
}
dataByPubKey[pubKey] = &format.ProtectionData{
Pubkey: pubKeyHex,
SignedBlocks: signedBlocks,
SignedAttestations: nil,
}
if err := bar.Add(1); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
// Extract the signed attestations by public key.
bar = progress.InitializeProgressBar(
len(attestedPublicKeys), "Extracting signed attestations by validator public key",
)
for _, pubKey := range attestedPublicKeys {
if _, ok := filteredKeysMap[string(pubKey[:])]; len(filteredKeys) > 0 && !ok {
continue
}
pubKeyHex, err := pubKeyToHexString(pubKey[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "could not convert public key to hex string")
}
signedAttestations, err := signedAttestationsByPubKey(ctx, validatorDB, pubKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "could not retrieve signed attestations for public key %s", pubKeyHex)
}
if _, ok := dataByPubKey[pubKey]; ok {
dataByPubKey[pubKey].SignedAttestations = signedAttestations
} else {
dataByPubKey[pubKey] = &format.ProtectionData{
Pubkey: pubKeyHex,
SignedBlocks: nil,
SignedAttestations: signedAttestations,
}
}
if err := bar.Add(1); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
// Next we turn our map into a slice as expected by the EIP-3076 JSON standard.
dataList := make([]*format.ProtectionData, 0)
for _, item := range dataByPubKey {
if item.SignedAttestations == nil {
item.SignedAttestations = make([]*format.SignedAttestation, 0)
}
if item.SignedBlocks == nil {
item.SignedBlocks = make([]*format.SignedBlock, 0)
}
dataList = append(dataList, item)
}
sort.Slice(dataList, func(i, j int) bool {
return strings.Compare(dataList[i].Pubkey, dataList[j].Pubkey) < 0
})
interchangeJSON.Data = dataList
return interchangeJSON, nil
}
func signedAttestationsByPubKey(ctx context.Context, validatorDB db.Database, pubKey [fieldparams.BLSPubkeyLength]byte) ([]*format.SignedAttestation, error) {
// If a key does not have an attestation history in our database, we return nil.
// This way, a user will be able to export their slashing protection history
// even if one of their keys does not have a history of signed attestations.
history, err := validatorDB.AttestationHistoryForPubKey(ctx, pubKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "cannot get attestation history for public key")
}
if history == nil {
return nil, nil
}
signedAttestations := make([]*format.SignedAttestation, 0)
for i := 0; i < len(history); i++ {
att := history[i]
// Special edge case due to a bug in Prysm's old slashing protection schema. The bug
// manifests itself as the first entry in attester slashing protection history
// having a target epoch greater than the next entry in the list. If this manifests,
// we skip it to protect users. This check is the best trade-off we can make at
// the moment without creating any false positive slashable attestation exports.
// More information on the bug can found in https://github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/issues/8893.
if i == 0 && len(history) > 1 {
nextEntryTargetEpoch := history[1].Target
if att.Target > nextEntryTargetEpoch && att.Source == 0 {
continue
}
}
var root string
if len(att.SigningRoot) != 0 {
root, err = rootToHexString(att.SigningRoot)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "could not convert signing root to hex string")
}
}
signedAttestations = append(signedAttestations, &format.SignedAttestation{
TargetEpoch: fmt.Sprintf("%d", att.Target),
SourceEpoch: fmt.Sprintf("%d", att.Source),
SigningRoot: root,
})
}
return signedAttestations, nil
}
func signedBlocksByPubKey(ctx context.Context, validatorDB db.Database, pubKey [fieldparams.BLSPubkeyLength]byte) ([]*format.SignedBlock, error) {
// If a key does not have a lowest or highest signed proposal history
// in our database, we return nil. This way, a user will be able to export their
// slashing protection history even if one of their keys does not have a history
// of signed blocks.
proposalHistory, err := validatorDB.ProposalHistoryForPubKey(ctx, pubKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "could not get proposal history for public key: %#x", pubKey)
}
signedBlocks := make([]*format.SignedBlock, 0)
for _, proposal := range proposalHistory {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "context canceled")
}
signingRootHex, err := rootToHexString(proposal.SigningRoot)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "could not convert signing root to hex string")
}
signedBlocks = append(signedBlocks, &format.SignedBlock{
Slot: fmt.Sprintf("%d", proposal.Slot),
SigningRoot: signingRootHex,
})
}
return signedBlocks, nil
}