mirror of
https://gitlab.com/pulsechaincom/prysm-pulse.git
synced 2024-12-25 21:07:18 +00:00
359b9bef49
* Merge split-up local protection flags * Fix deprecated flags * Fix text
128 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
128 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
package client
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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ethpb "github.com/prysmaticlabs/ethereumapis/eth/v1alpha1"
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slashpb "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/proto/slashing"
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"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/shared/featureconfig"
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"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/shared/params"
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)
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var failedPreAttSignLocalErr = "attempted to make slashable attestation, rejected by local slashing protection"
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var failedPreAttSignExternalErr = "attempted to make slashable attestation, rejected by external slasher service"
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var failedPostAttSignExternalErr = "external slasher service detected a submitted slashable attestation"
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func (v *validator) preAttSignValidations(ctx context.Context, indexedAtt *ethpb.IndexedAttestation, pubKey [48]byte) error {
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fmtKey := fmt.Sprintf("%#x", pubKey[:])
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if featureconfig.Get().LocalProtection {
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v.attesterHistoryByPubKeyLock.RLock()
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attesterHistory := v.attesterHistoryByPubKey[pubKey]
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v.attesterHistoryByPubKeyLock.RUnlock()
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if isNewAttSlashable(attesterHistory, indexedAtt.Data.Source.Epoch, indexedAtt.Data.Target.Epoch) {
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if v.emitAccountMetrics {
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ValidatorAttestFailVec.WithLabelValues(fmtKey).Inc()
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}
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return errors.New(failedPreAttSignLocalErr)
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}
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}
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if featureconfig.Get().SlasherProtection && v.protector != nil {
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if !v.protector.CheckAttestationSafety(ctx, indexedAtt) {
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if v.emitAccountMetrics {
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ValidatorAttestFailVecSlasher.WithLabelValues(fmtKey).Inc()
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}
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return errors.New(failedPreAttSignExternalErr)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (v *validator) postAttSignUpdate(ctx context.Context, indexedAtt *ethpb.IndexedAttestation, pubKey [48]byte) error {
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fmtKey := fmt.Sprintf("%#x", pubKey[:])
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if featureconfig.Get().LocalProtection {
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v.attesterHistoryByPubKeyLock.Lock()
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attesterHistory := v.attesterHistoryByPubKey[pubKey]
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attesterHistory = markAttestationForTargetEpoch(attesterHistory, indexedAtt.Data.Source.Epoch, indexedAtt.Data.Target.Epoch)
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v.attesterHistoryByPubKey[pubKey] = attesterHistory
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v.attesterHistoryByPubKeyLock.Unlock()
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}
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if featureconfig.Get().SlasherProtection && v.protector != nil {
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if !v.protector.CommitAttestation(ctx, indexedAtt) {
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if v.emitAccountMetrics {
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ValidatorAttestFailVecSlasher.WithLabelValues(fmtKey).Inc()
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}
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return errors.New(failedPostAttSignExternalErr)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// isNewAttSlashable uses the attestation history to determine if an attestation of sourceEpoch
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// and targetEpoch would be slashable. It can detect double, surrounding, and surrounded votes.
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func isNewAttSlashable(history *slashpb.AttestationHistory, sourceEpoch uint64, targetEpoch uint64) bool {
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farFuture := params.BeaconConfig().FarFutureEpoch
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wsPeriod := params.BeaconConfig().WeakSubjectivityPeriod
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// Previously pruned, we should return false.
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if int(targetEpoch) <= int(history.LatestEpochWritten)-int(wsPeriod) {
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return false
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}
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// Check if there has already been a vote for this target epoch.
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if safeTargetToSource(history, targetEpoch) != farFuture {
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return true
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}
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// Check if the new attestation would be surrounding another attestation.
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for i := sourceEpoch; i <= targetEpoch; i++ {
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// Unattested for epochs are marked as FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH.
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if safeTargetToSource(history, i) == farFuture {
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continue
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}
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if history.TargetToSource[i%wsPeriod] > sourceEpoch {
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return true
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}
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}
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// Check if the new attestation is being surrounded.
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for i := targetEpoch; i <= history.LatestEpochWritten; i++ {
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if safeTargetToSource(history, i) < sourceEpoch {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// markAttestationForTargetEpoch returns the modified attestation history with the passed-in epochs marked
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// as attested for. This is done to prevent the validator client from signing any slashable attestations.
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func markAttestationForTargetEpoch(history *slashpb.AttestationHistory, sourceEpoch uint64, targetEpoch uint64) *slashpb.AttestationHistory {
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wsPeriod := params.BeaconConfig().WeakSubjectivityPeriod
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if targetEpoch > history.LatestEpochWritten {
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// If the target epoch to mark is ahead of latest written epoch, override the old targets and mark the requested epoch.
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// Limit the overwriting to one weak subjectivity period as further is not needed.
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maxToWrite := history.LatestEpochWritten + wsPeriod
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for i := history.LatestEpochWritten + 1; i < targetEpoch && i <= maxToWrite; i++ {
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history.TargetToSource[i%wsPeriod] = params.BeaconConfig().FarFutureEpoch
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}
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history.LatestEpochWritten = targetEpoch
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}
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history.TargetToSource[targetEpoch%wsPeriod] = sourceEpoch
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return history
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}
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// safeTargetToSource makes sure the epoch accessed is within bounds, and if it's not it at
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// returns the "default" FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH value.
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func safeTargetToSource(history *slashpb.AttestationHistory, targetEpoch uint64) uint64 {
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wsPeriod := params.BeaconConfig().WeakSubjectivityPeriod
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if targetEpoch > history.LatestEpochWritten || int(targetEpoch) < int(history.LatestEpochWritten)-int(wsPeriod) {
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return params.BeaconConfig().FarFutureEpoch
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}
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return history.TargetToSource[targetEpoch%wsPeriod]
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}
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