mirror of
https://gitlab.com/pulsechaincom/prysm-pulse.git
synced 2024-12-25 21:07:18 +00:00
684 lines
26 KiB
Go
684 lines
26 KiB
Go
// Package blocks contains block processing libraries. These libraries
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// process and verify block specific messages such as PoW receipt root,
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// RANDAO, validator deposits, exits and slashing proofs.
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package blocks
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/binary"
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"fmt"
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"reflect"
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"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/beacon-chain/core/state/stateutils"
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v "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/beacon-chain/core/validators"
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pb "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/proto/beacon/p2p/v1"
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bytesutil "github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/shared/bytes"
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"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/shared/hashutil"
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"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/shared/params"
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"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/shared/slices"
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"github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/shared/trie"
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)
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// ProcessDepositRoots processes the proof-of-work chain's receipts
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// contained in a beacon block and appends them as candidate receipt roots
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// in the beacon state.
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//
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// Official spec definition for processing deposit roots:
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// If block.deposit_root is deposit_root_vote.deposit_root
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// for some deposit_root_vote in state.deposit_root_votes,
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// set deposit_root_vote.vote_count += 1.
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// Otherwise, append to state.deposit_root_votes a
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// new DepositRootVote(
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// deposit_root=block.deposit_root,
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// vote_count=1
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// )
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func ProcessDepositRoots(
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beaconState *pb.BeaconState,
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block *pb.BeaconBlock,
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) *pb.BeaconState {
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var newCandidateReceiptRoots []*pb.DepositRootVote
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currentCandidateReceiptRoots := beaconState.DepositRootVotes
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for idx, root := range currentCandidateReceiptRoots {
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if bytes.Equal(block.DepositRootHash32, root.DepositRootHash32) {
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currentCandidateReceiptRoots[idx].VoteCount++
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} else {
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newCandidateReceiptRoots = append(newCandidateReceiptRoots, &pb.DepositRootVote{
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DepositRootHash32: block.DepositRootHash32,
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VoteCount: 1,
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})
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}
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}
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beaconState.DepositRootVotes = append(currentCandidateReceiptRoots, newCandidateReceiptRoots...)
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return beaconState
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}
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// ProcessBlockRandao checks the block proposer's
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// randao commitment and generates a new randao mix to update
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// in the beacon state's latest randao mixes and set the proposer's randao fields.
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//
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// Official spec definition for block randao verification:
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// Let repeat_hash(x, n) = x if n == 0 else repeat_hash(hash(x), n-1).
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// Let proposer = state.validator_registry[get_beacon_proposer_index(state, state.slot)].
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// Verify that repeat_hash(block.randao_reveal, proposer.randao_layers) == proposer.randao_commitment.
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// Set state.latest_randao_mixes[state.slot % LATEST_RANDAO_MIXES_LENGTH] =
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// xor(state.latest_randao_mixes[state.slot % LATEST_RANDAO_MIXES_LENGTH], block.randao_reveal)
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// Set proposer.randao_commitment = block.randao_reveal.
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// Set proposer.randao_layers = 0
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func ProcessBlockRandao(beaconState *pb.BeaconState, block *pb.BeaconBlock) (*pb.BeaconState, error) {
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proposerIndex, err := v.BeaconProposerIdx(beaconState, beaconState.Slot)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not fetch beacon proposer index: %v", err)
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}
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registry := beaconState.ValidatorRegistry
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proposer := registry[proposerIndex]
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if err := verifyBlockRandao(proposer, block); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not verify block randao: %v", err)
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}
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// If block randao passed verification, we XOR the state's latest randao mix with the block's
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// randao and update the state's corresponding latest randao mix value.
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latestMixesLength := params.BeaconConfig().LatestRandaoMixesLength
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latestMixSlice := beaconState.LatestRandaoMixesHash32S[beaconState.Slot%latestMixesLength]
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latestMix := bytesutil.ToBytes32(latestMixSlice)
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for i, x := range block.RandaoRevealHash32 {
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latestMix[i] ^= x
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}
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proposer.RandaoCommitmentHash32 = block.RandaoRevealHash32
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proposer.RandaoLayers = 0
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registry[proposerIndex] = proposer
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beaconState.LatestRandaoMixesHash32S[beaconState.Slot%latestMixesLength] = latestMix[:]
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beaconState.ValidatorRegistry = registry
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return beaconState, nil
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}
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func verifyBlockRandao(proposer *pb.ValidatorRecord, block *pb.BeaconBlock) error {
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blockRandaoReveal := bytesutil.ToBytes32(block.RandaoRevealHash32)
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proposerRandaoCommit := bytesutil.ToBytes32(proposer.RandaoCommitmentHash32)
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randaoHashLayers := hashutil.RepeatHash(blockRandaoReveal, proposer.RandaoLayers)
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// Verify that repeat_hash(block.randao_reveal, proposer.randao_layers) == proposer.randao_commitment.
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if randaoHashLayers != proposerRandaoCommit {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"expected hashed block randao layers to equal proposer randao: received %#x = %#x",
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randaoHashLayers[:],
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proposerRandaoCommit[:],
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)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ProcessProposerSlashings is one of the operations performed
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// on each processed beacon block to penalize proposers based on
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// slashing conditions if any slashable events occurred.
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//
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// Official spec definition for proposer slashings:
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// Verify that len(block.body.proposer_slashings) <= MAX_PROPOSER_SLASHINGS.
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//
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// For each proposer_slashing in block.body.proposer_slashings:
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//
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// Let proposer = state.validator_registry[proposer_slashing.proposer_index].
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// Verify that bls_verify(pubkey=proposer.pubkey, msg=hash_tree_root(
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// proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1),
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// sig=proposer_slashing.proposal_signature_1,
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// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL)).
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// Verify that bls_verify(pubkey=proposer.pubkey, msg=hash_tree_root(
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// proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2),
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// sig=proposer_slashing.proposal_signature_2,
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// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.slot, DOMAIN_PROPOSAL)).
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// Verify that proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.slot == proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.slot.
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// Verify that proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.shard == proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.shard.
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// Verify that proposer_slashing.proposal_data_1.block_root != proposer_slashing.proposal_data_2.block_root.
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// Verify that validator.penalized_slot > state.slot.
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// Run penalize_validator(state, proposer_slashing.proposer_index).
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func ProcessProposerSlashings(
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beaconState *pb.BeaconState,
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block *pb.BeaconBlock,
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) (*pb.BeaconState, error) {
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body := block.Body
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registry := beaconState.ValidatorRegistry
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if uint64(len(body.ProposerSlashings)) > params.BeaconConfig().MaxProposerSlashings {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(
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"number of proposer slashings (%d) exceeds allowed threshold of %d",
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len(body.ProposerSlashings),
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params.BeaconConfig().MaxProposerSlashings,
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)
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}
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var err error
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for idx, slashing := range body.ProposerSlashings {
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if err = verifyProposerSlashing(slashing); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not verify proposer slashing #%d: %v", idx, err)
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}
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proposer := registry[slashing.ProposerIndex]
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if proposer.PenalizedSlot > beaconState.Slot {
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beaconState, err = v.PenalizeValidator(beaconState, slashing.ProposerIndex)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not penalize proposer index %d: %v",
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slashing.ProposerIndex, err)
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}
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}
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}
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return beaconState, nil
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}
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func verifyProposerSlashing(
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slashing *pb.ProposerSlashing,
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) error {
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// TODO(#258): Verify BLS according to the specification in the "Proposer Slashings"
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// section of block operations.
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slot1 := slashing.ProposalData_1.Slot
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slot2 := slashing.ProposalData_2.Slot
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shard1 := slashing.ProposalData_1.Shard
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shard2 := slashing.ProposalData_2.Shard
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root1 := slashing.ProposalData_1.BlockRootHash32
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root2 := slashing.ProposalData_2.BlockRootHash32
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if slot1 != slot2 {
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return fmt.Errorf("slashing proposal data slots do not match: %d, %d", slot1, slot2)
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}
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if shard1 != shard2 {
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return fmt.Errorf("slashing proposal data shards do not match: %d, %d", shard1, shard2)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(root1, root2) {
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return fmt.Errorf("slashing proposal data block roots do not match: %#x, %#x", root1, root2)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ProcessCasperSlashings is one of the operations performed
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// on each processed beacon block to penalize validators based on
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// Casper FFG slashing conditions if any slashable events occurred.
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//
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// Official spec definition for casper slashings:
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//
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// Verify that len(block.body.casper_slashings) <= MAX_CASPER_SLASHINGS.
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// For each casper_slashing in block.body.casper_slashings:
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//
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// Verify that verify_casper_votes(state, casper_slashing.votes_1).
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// Verify that verify_casper_votes(state, casper_slashing.votes_2).
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// Verify that casper_slashing.votes_1.data != casper_slashing.votes_2.data.
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// Let indices(vote) = vote.aggregate_signature_poc_0_indices +
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// vote.aggregate_signature_poc_1_indices.
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// Let intersection = [x for x in indices(casper_slashing.votes_1)
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// if x in indices(casper_slashing.votes_2)].
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// Verify that len(intersection) >= 1.
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// Verify the following about the casper votes:
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// (vote1.justified_slot < vote2.justified_slot) &&
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// (vote2.justified_slot + 1 == vote2.slot) &&
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// (vote2.slot < vote1.slot)
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// OR
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// vote1.slot == vote.slot
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// Verify that casper_slashing.votes_1.data.justified_slot + 1 <
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// casper_slashing.votes_2.data.justified_slot + 1 ==
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// casper_slashing.votes_2.data.slot < casper_slashing.votes_1.data.slot
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// or casper_slashing.votes_1.data.slot == casper_slashing.votes_2.data.slot.
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// For each validator index i in intersection,
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// if state.validator_registry[i].penalized_slot > state.slot, then
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// run penalize_validator(state, i)
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func ProcessCasperSlashings(
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beaconState *pb.BeaconState,
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block *pb.BeaconBlock,
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) (*pb.BeaconState, error) {
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body := block.Body
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registry := beaconState.ValidatorRegistry
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if uint64(len(body.CasperSlashings)) > params.BeaconConfig().MaxCasperSlashings {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(
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"number of casper slashings (%d) exceeds allowed threshold of %d",
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len(body.CasperSlashings),
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params.BeaconConfig().MaxCasperSlashings,
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)
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}
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for idx, slashing := range body.CasperSlashings {
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if err := verifyCasperSlashing(slashing); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not verify casper slashing #%d: %v", idx, err)
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}
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validatorIndices, err := casperSlashingPenalizedIndices(slashing)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not determine validator indices to penalize: %v", err)
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}
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for _, validatorIndex := range validatorIndices {
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penalizedValidator := registry[validatorIndex]
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if penalizedValidator.PenalizedSlot > beaconState.Slot {
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beaconState, err = v.PenalizeValidator(beaconState, validatorIndex)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not penalize validator index %d: %v",
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validatorIndex, err)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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return beaconState, nil
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}
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func verifyCasperSlashing(slashing *pb.CasperSlashing) error {
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votes1 := slashing.Votes_1
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votes2 := slashing.Votes_2
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votes1Attestation := votes1.Data
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votes2Attestation := votes2.Data
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if err := verifyCasperVotes(votes1); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("could not verify casper votes 1: %v", err)
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}
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if err := verifyCasperVotes(votes2); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("could not verify casper votes 2: %v", err)
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}
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// Inner attestation data structures for the votes should not be equal,
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// as that would mean both votes are the same and therefore no slashing
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// should occur.
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if reflect.DeepEqual(votes1Attestation, votes2Attestation) {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"casper slashing inner vote attestation data should not match: %v, %v",
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votes1Attestation,
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votes2Attestation,
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)
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}
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// Unless the following holds, the slashing is invalid:
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// (vote1.justified_slot < vote2.justified_slot) &&
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// (vote2.justified_slot + 1 == vote2.slot) &&
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// (vote2.slot < vote1.slot)
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// OR
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// vote1.slot == vote2.slot
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justificationValidity := (votes1Attestation.JustifiedSlot < votes2Attestation.JustifiedSlot) &&
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(votes2Attestation.JustifiedSlot+1 == votes2Attestation.Slot) &&
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(votes2Attestation.Slot < votes1Attestation.Slot)
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slotsEqual := votes1Attestation.Slot == votes2Attestation.Slot
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if !(justificationValidity || slotsEqual) {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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`
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Expected the following conditions to hold:
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(vote1.JustifiedSlot < vote2.JustifiedSlot) &&
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(vote2.JustifiedSlot + 1 == vote2.Slot) &&
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(vote2.Slot < vote1.Slot)
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OR
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vote1.Slot == vote.Slot
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Instead, received vote1.JustifiedSlot %d, vote2.JustifiedSlot %d
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and vote1.Slot %d, vote2.Slot %d
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`,
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votes1Attestation.JustifiedSlot,
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votes2Attestation.JustifiedSlot,
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votes1Attestation.Slot,
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votes2Attestation.Slot,
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)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func casperSlashingPenalizedIndices(slashing *pb.CasperSlashing) ([]uint32, error) {
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votes1 := slashing.Votes_1
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votes2 := slashing.Votes_2
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votes1Indices := append(
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votes1.CustodyBit_0Indices,
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votes1.CustodyBit_1Indices...,
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)
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votes2Indices := append(
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votes2.CustodyBit_0Indices,
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votes2.CustodyBit_1Indices...,
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)
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indicesIntersection := slices.Intersection(votes1Indices, votes2Indices)
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if len(indicesIntersection) < 1 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(
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"expected intersection of vote indices to be non-empty: %v",
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indicesIntersection,
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)
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}
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return indicesIntersection, nil
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}
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func verifyCasperVotes(votes *pb.SlashableVoteData) error {
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totalCustody := len(votes.CustodyBit_0Indices) +
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len(votes.CustodyBit_1Indices)
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if uint64(totalCustody) > params.BeaconConfig().MaxCasperVotes {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"exceeded allowed casper votes (%d), received %d",
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params.BeaconConfig().MaxCasperVotes,
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totalCustody,
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)
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}
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// TODO(#258): Implement BLS verify multiple.
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// pubs = aggregate_pubkeys for each validator in registry for poc0 and poc1
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// indices
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// bls_verify_multiple(
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// pubkeys=pubs,
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// messages=[
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// hash_tree_root(votes)+bytes1(0),
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// hash_tree_root(votes)+bytes1(1),
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// signature=aggregate_signature
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// ]
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// )
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return nil
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}
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// ProcessBlockAttestations applies processing operations to a block's inner attestation
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// records. This function returns a list of pending attestations which can then be
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// appended to the BeaconState's latest attestations.
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//
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// Official spec definition for block attestation processing:
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// Verify that len(block.body.attestations) <= MAX_ATTESTATIONS.
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//
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// For each attestation in block.body.attestations:
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// Verify that attestation.data.slot + MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY <= state.slot.
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// Verify that attestation.data.slot + EPOCH_LENGTH >= state.slot.
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// Verify that attestation.data.justified_slot is equal to
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// state.justified_slot if attestation.data.slot >=
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// state.slot - (state.slot % EPOCH_LENGTH) else state.previous_justified_slot.
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// Verify that attestation.data.justified_block_root is equal to
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// get_block_root(state, attestation.data.justified_slot).
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// Verify that either attestation.data.latest_crosslink_root or
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// attestation.data.shard_block_root equals
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// state.latest_crosslinks[shard].shard_block_root
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// Aggregate_signature verification:
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// Let participants = get_attestation_participants(
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// state,
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// attestation.data,
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// attestation.participation_bitfield,
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// )
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// Let group_public_key = BLSAddPubkeys([
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// state.validator_registry[v].pubkey for v in participants
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// ])
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// Verify that bls_verify(
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// pubkey=group_public_key,
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// message=hash_tree_root(attestation.data) + bytes1(0),
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// signature=attestation.aggregate_signature,
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// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, attestation.data.slot, DOMAIN_ATTESTATION)).
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//
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// [TO BE REMOVED IN PHASE 1] Verify that attestation.data.shard_block_hash == ZERO_HASH.
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// return PendingAttestationRecord(
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// data=attestation.data,
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// participation_bitfield=attestation.participation_bitfield,
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// custody_bitfield=attestation.custody_bitfield,
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// slot_included=state.slot,
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// ) which can then be appended to state.latest_attestations.
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func ProcessBlockAttestations(
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beaconState *pb.BeaconState,
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block *pb.BeaconBlock,
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) (*pb.BeaconState, error) {
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atts := block.Body.Attestations
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if uint64(len(atts)) > params.BeaconConfig().MaxAttestations {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(
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"number of attestations in block (%d) exceeds allowed threshold of %d",
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len(atts),
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params.BeaconConfig().MaxAttestations,
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)
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}
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var pendingAttestations []*pb.PendingAttestationRecord
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for idx, attestation := range atts {
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if err := verifyAttestation(beaconState, attestation); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not verify attestation at index %d in block: %v", idx, err)
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}
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pendingAttestations = append(pendingAttestations, &pb.PendingAttestationRecord{
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Data: attestation.Data,
|
|
ParticipationBitfield: attestation.ParticipationBitfield,
|
|
CustodyBitfield: attestation.CustodyBitfield,
|
|
SlotIncluded: beaconState.Slot,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
beaconState.LatestAttestations = pendingAttestations
|
|
return beaconState, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func verifyAttestation(beaconState *pb.BeaconState, att *pb.Attestation) error {
|
|
inclusionDelay := params.BeaconConfig().MinAttestationInclusionDelay
|
|
if att.Data.Slot+inclusionDelay > beaconState.Slot {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"attestation slot (slot %d) + inclusion delay (%d) beyond current beacon state slot (%d)",
|
|
att.Data.Slot,
|
|
inclusionDelay,
|
|
beaconState.Slot,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
if att.Data.Slot+params.BeaconConfig().EpochLength < beaconState.Slot {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"attestation slot (slot %d) + epoch length (%d) less than current beacon state slot (%d)",
|
|
att.Data.Slot,
|
|
params.BeaconConfig().EpochLength,
|
|
beaconState.Slot,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
// Verify that attestation.JustifiedSlot is equal to
|
|
// state.JustifiedSlot if attestation.Slot >=
|
|
// state.Slot - (state.Slot % EPOCH_LENGTH) else state.PreviousJustifiedSlot.
|
|
if att.Data.Slot >= beaconState.Slot-(beaconState.Slot%params.BeaconConfig().EpochLength) {
|
|
if att.Data.JustifiedSlot != beaconState.JustifiedSlot {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"expected attestation.JustifiedSlot == state.JustifiedSlot, received %d == %d",
|
|
att.Data.JustifiedSlot,
|
|
beaconState.JustifiedSlot,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if att.Data.JustifiedSlot != beaconState.PreviousJustifiedSlot {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"expected attestation.JustifiedSlot == state.PreviousJustifiedSlot, received %d == %d",
|
|
att.Data.JustifiedSlot,
|
|
beaconState.PreviousJustifiedSlot,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that attestation.data.justified_block_root is equal to
|
|
// get_block_root(state, attestation.data.justified_slot).
|
|
blockRoot, err := BlockRoot(beaconState, att.Data.JustifiedSlot)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("could not get block root for justified slot: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
justifiedBlockRoot := att.Data.JustifiedBlockRootHash32
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(justifiedBlockRoot, blockRoot) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"expected JustifiedBlockRoot == getBlockRoot(state, JustifiedSlot): got %#x = %#x",
|
|
justifiedBlockRoot,
|
|
blockRoot,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that either: attestation.data.latest_crosslink_root or
|
|
// attestation.data.shard_block_root equals
|
|
// state.latest_crosslinks[shard].shard_block_root
|
|
crossLinkRoot := att.Data.LatestCrosslinkRootHash32
|
|
shardBlockRoot := att.Data.ShardBlockRootHash32
|
|
shard := att.Data.Shard
|
|
stateShardBlockRoot := beaconState.LatestCrosslinks[shard].ShardBlockRootHash32
|
|
|
|
if !(bytes.Equal(crossLinkRoot, stateShardBlockRoot) ||
|
|
bytes.Equal(shardBlockRoot, stateShardBlockRoot)) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"attestation.CrossLinkRoot and ShardBlockRoot != %v (state.LatestCrosslinks' ShardBlockRoot)",
|
|
stateShardBlockRoot,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify attestation.shard_block_root == ZERO_HASH [TO BE REMOVED IN PHASE 1].
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(att.Data.ShardBlockRootHash32, []byte{}) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"expected attestation.ShardBlockRoot == %#x, received %#x instead",
|
|
[]byte{},
|
|
att.Data.ShardBlockRootHash32,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
// TODO(#258): Integrate BLS signature verification for attestation.
|
|
// Let participants = get_attestation_participants(
|
|
// state,
|
|
// attestation.data,
|
|
// attestation.participation_bitfield,
|
|
// )
|
|
// Let group_public_key = BLSAddPubkeys([
|
|
// state.validator_registry[v].pubkey for v in participants
|
|
// ])
|
|
// Verify that bls_verify(
|
|
// pubkey=group_public_key,
|
|
// message=hash_tree_root(attestation.data) + bytes1(0),
|
|
// signature=attestation.aggregate_signature,
|
|
// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, attestation.data.slot, DOMAIN_ATTESTATION)).
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ProcessValidatorDeposits is one of the operations performed on each processed
|
|
// beacon block to verify queued validators from the Ethereum 1.0 Deposit Contract
|
|
// into the beacon chain.
|
|
//
|
|
// Official spec definition for processing validator deposits:
|
|
// Verify that len(block.body.deposits) <= MAX_DEPOSITS.
|
|
// For each deposit in block.body.deposits:
|
|
// Let serialized_deposit_data be the serialized form of deposit.deposit_data.
|
|
// It should be the DepositInput followed by 8 bytes for deposit_data.value
|
|
// and 8 bytes for deposit_data.timestamp. That is, it should match
|
|
// deposit_data in the Ethereum 1.0 deposit contract of which the hash
|
|
// was placed into the Merkle tree.
|
|
//
|
|
// Verify deposit merkle_branch, setting leaf=serialized_deposit_data,
|
|
// depth=DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_TREE_DEPTH and root=state.latest_deposit_root:
|
|
//
|
|
// Run the following:
|
|
// process_deposit(
|
|
// state=state,
|
|
// pubkey=deposit.deposit_data.deposit_input.pubkey,
|
|
// deposit=deposit.deposit_data.value,
|
|
// proof_of_possession=deposit.deposit_data.deposit_input.proof_of_possession,
|
|
// withdrawal_credentials=deposit.deposit_data.deposit_input.withdrawal_credentials,
|
|
// randao_commitment=deposit.deposit_data.deposit_input.randao_commitment,
|
|
// poc_commitment=deposit.deposit_data.deposit_input.poc_commitment,
|
|
// )
|
|
func ProcessValidatorDeposits(
|
|
beaconState *pb.BeaconState,
|
|
block *pb.BeaconBlock,
|
|
) (*pb.BeaconState, error) {
|
|
deposits := block.Body.Deposits
|
|
if uint64(len(deposits)) > params.BeaconConfig().MaxDeposits {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"number of deposits (%d) exceeds allowed threshold of %d",
|
|
len(deposits),
|
|
params.BeaconConfig().MaxDeposits,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
var err error
|
|
var depositInput *pb.DepositInput
|
|
validatorIndexMap := stateutils.ValidatorIndexMap(beaconState)
|
|
for idx, deposit := range deposits {
|
|
depositData := deposit.DepositData
|
|
depositInput, err = DecodeDepositInput(depositData)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not decode deposit input: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err = verifyDeposit(beaconState, deposit); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not verify deposit #%d: %v", idx, err)
|
|
}
|
|
// depositData consists of depositValue [8]byte +
|
|
// depositTimestamp [8]byte + depositInput []byte .
|
|
depositValue := depositData[:8]
|
|
// We then mutate the beacon state with the verified validator deposit.
|
|
beaconState, err = v.ProcessDeposit(
|
|
beaconState,
|
|
validatorIndexMap,
|
|
depositInput.Pubkey,
|
|
binary.BigEndian.Uint64(depositValue),
|
|
depositInput.ProofOfPossession,
|
|
depositInput.WithdrawalCredentialsHash32,
|
|
depositInput.RandaoCommitmentHash32,
|
|
depositInput.CustodyCommitmentHash32,
|
|
)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not process deposit into beacon state: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return beaconState, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func verifyDeposit(beaconState *pb.BeaconState, deposit *pb.Deposit) error {
|
|
// Verify Merkle proof of deposit and deposit trie root.
|
|
receiptRoot := bytesutil.ToBytes32(beaconState.LatestDepositRootHash32)
|
|
if ok := trie.VerifyMerkleBranch(
|
|
hashutil.Hash(deposit.DepositData),
|
|
deposit.MerkleBranchHash32S,
|
|
params.BeaconConfig().DepositContractTreeDepth,
|
|
deposit.MerkleTreeIndex,
|
|
receiptRoot,
|
|
); !ok {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"deposit merkle branch of deposit root did not verify for root: %#x",
|
|
receiptRoot,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ProcessValidatorExits is one of the operations performed
|
|
// on each processed beacon block to determine which validators
|
|
// should exit the state's validator registry.
|
|
//
|
|
// Official spec definition for processing exits:
|
|
//
|
|
// Verify that len(block.body.exits) <= MAX_EXITS.
|
|
//
|
|
// For each exit in block.body.exits:
|
|
// Let validator = state.validator_registry[exit.validator_index].
|
|
// Verify that validator.exit_slot > state.slot + ENTRY_EXIT_DELAY.
|
|
// Verify that state.slot >= exit.slot.
|
|
// Verify that state.slot >= validator.latest_status_change_slot +
|
|
// SHARD_PERSISTENT_COMMITTEE_CHANGE_PERIOD.
|
|
// Let exit_message = hash_tree_root(
|
|
// Exit(
|
|
// slot=exit.slot,
|
|
// validator_index=exit.validator_index,
|
|
// signature=EMPTY_SIGNATURE
|
|
// )
|
|
// ).
|
|
// Verify that bls_verify(
|
|
// pubkey=validator.pubkey,
|
|
// message=exit_message,
|
|
// signature=exit.signature,
|
|
// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, exit.slot, DOMAIN_EXIT),
|
|
// )
|
|
// Run initiate_validator_exit(
|
|
// state, exit.validator_index,
|
|
// )
|
|
func ProcessValidatorExits(
|
|
beaconState *pb.BeaconState,
|
|
block *pb.BeaconBlock,
|
|
) (*pb.BeaconState, error) {
|
|
exits := block.Body.Exits
|
|
if uint64(len(exits)) > params.BeaconConfig().MaxExits {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"number of exits (%d) exceeds allowed threshold of %d",
|
|
len(exits),
|
|
params.BeaconConfig().MaxExits,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
validatorRegistry := beaconState.ValidatorRegistry
|
|
for idx, exit := range exits {
|
|
if err := verifyExit(beaconState, exit); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not verify exit #%d: %v", idx, err)
|
|
}
|
|
beaconState = v.InitiateValidatorExit(beaconState, exit.ValidatorIndex)
|
|
}
|
|
beaconState.ValidatorRegistry = validatorRegistry
|
|
return beaconState, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func verifyExit(beaconState *pb.BeaconState, exit *pb.Exit) error {
|
|
validator := beaconState.ValidatorRegistry[exit.ValidatorIndex]
|
|
if validator.ExitSlot <= beaconState.Slot+params.BeaconConfig().EntryExitDelay {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"expected exit.Slot > state.Slot + EntryExitDelay, received %d < %d",
|
|
validator.ExitSlot, beaconState.Slot+params.BeaconConfig().EntryExitDelay,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
if beaconState.Slot < exit.Slot {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"expected state.Slot >= exit.Slot, received %d < %d",
|
|
beaconState.Slot,
|
|
exit.Slot,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
// TODO(#258): Verify using BLS signature verification below:
|
|
// Verify that bls_verify(
|
|
// pubkey=validator.pubkey,
|
|
// message=ZERO_HASH,
|
|
// signature=exit.signature,
|
|
// domain=get_domain(state.fork_data, exit.slot, DOMAIN_EXIT),
|
|
// )
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|