mirror of
https://gitlab.com/pulsechaincom/go-pulse.git
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462ddce5b2
This removes a bunch of weird code around the counter overflow check in concatKDF and makes it actually work for different hash output sizes. The overflow check worked as follows: concatKDF applies the hash function N times, where N is roundup(kdLen, hashsize) / hashsize. N should not overflow 32 bits because that would lead to a repetition in the KDF output. A couple issues with the overflow check: - It used the hash.BlockSize, which is wrong because the block size is about the input of the hash function. Luckily, all standard hash functions have a block size that's greater than the output size, so concatKDF didn't crash, it just generated too much key material. - The check used big.Int to compare against 2^32-1. - The calculation could still overflow before reaching the check. The new code in concatKDF doesn't check for overflow. Instead, there is a new check on ECIESParams which ensures that params.KeyLen is < 512. This removes any possibility of overflow. There are a couple of miscellaneous improvements bundled in with this change: - The key buffer is pre-allocated instead of appending the hash output to an initially empty slice. - The code that uses concatKDF to derive keys is now shared between Encrypt and Decrypt. - There was a redundant invocation of IsOnCurve in Decrypt. This is now removed because elliptic.Unmarshal already checks whether the input is a valid curve point since Go 1.5. Co-authored-by: Felix Lange <fjl@twurst.com>
318 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
318 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2013 Kyle Isom <kyle@tyrfingr.is>
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// Copyright (c) 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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//
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// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
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// met:
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//
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// * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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// * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
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// copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
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// in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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// distribution.
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// * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
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// contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
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// this software without specific prior written permission.
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//
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// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
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// "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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// LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
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// A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
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// OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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// LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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// DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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// THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
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// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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package ecies
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import (
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/binary"
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"fmt"
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"hash"
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"io"
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"math/big"
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)
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var (
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ErrImport = fmt.Errorf("ecies: failed to import key")
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ErrInvalidCurve = fmt.Errorf("ecies: invalid elliptic curve")
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ErrInvalidPublicKey = fmt.Errorf("ecies: invalid public key")
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ErrSharedKeyIsPointAtInfinity = fmt.Errorf("ecies: shared key is point at infinity")
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ErrSharedKeyTooBig = fmt.Errorf("ecies: shared key params are too big")
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)
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// PublicKey is a representation of an elliptic curve public key.
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type PublicKey struct {
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X *big.Int
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Y *big.Int
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elliptic.Curve
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Params *ECIESParams
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}
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// Export an ECIES public key as an ECDSA public key.
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func (pub *PublicKey) ExportECDSA() *ecdsa.PublicKey {
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return &ecdsa.PublicKey{Curve: pub.Curve, X: pub.X, Y: pub.Y}
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}
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// Import an ECDSA public key as an ECIES public key.
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func ImportECDSAPublic(pub *ecdsa.PublicKey) *PublicKey {
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return &PublicKey{
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X: pub.X,
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Y: pub.Y,
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Curve: pub.Curve,
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Params: ParamsFromCurve(pub.Curve),
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}
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}
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// PrivateKey is a representation of an elliptic curve private key.
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type PrivateKey struct {
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PublicKey
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D *big.Int
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}
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// Export an ECIES private key as an ECDSA private key.
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func (prv *PrivateKey) ExportECDSA() *ecdsa.PrivateKey {
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pub := &prv.PublicKey
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pubECDSA := pub.ExportECDSA()
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return &ecdsa.PrivateKey{PublicKey: *pubECDSA, D: prv.D}
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}
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// Import an ECDSA private key as an ECIES private key.
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func ImportECDSA(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
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pub := ImportECDSAPublic(&prv.PublicKey)
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return &PrivateKey{*pub, prv.D}
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}
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// Generate an elliptic curve public / private keypair. If params is nil,
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// the recommended default parameters for the key will be chosen.
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func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader, curve elliptic.Curve, params *ECIESParams) (prv *PrivateKey, err error) {
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pb, x, y, err := elliptic.GenerateKey(curve, rand)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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prv = new(PrivateKey)
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prv.PublicKey.X = x
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prv.PublicKey.Y = y
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prv.PublicKey.Curve = curve
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prv.D = new(big.Int).SetBytes(pb)
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if params == nil {
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params = ParamsFromCurve(curve)
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}
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prv.PublicKey.Params = params
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return
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}
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// MaxSharedKeyLength returns the maximum length of the shared key the
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// public key can produce.
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func MaxSharedKeyLength(pub *PublicKey) int {
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return (pub.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
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}
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// ECDH key agreement method used to establish secret keys for encryption.
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func (prv *PrivateKey) GenerateShared(pub *PublicKey, skLen, macLen int) (sk []byte, err error) {
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if prv.PublicKey.Curve != pub.Curve {
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return nil, ErrInvalidCurve
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}
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if skLen+macLen > MaxSharedKeyLength(pub) {
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return nil, ErrSharedKeyTooBig
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}
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x, _ := pub.Curve.ScalarMult(pub.X, pub.Y, prv.D.Bytes())
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if x == nil {
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return nil, ErrSharedKeyIsPointAtInfinity
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}
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sk = make([]byte, skLen+macLen)
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skBytes := x.Bytes()
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copy(sk[len(sk)-len(skBytes):], skBytes)
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return sk, nil
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}
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var (
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ErrSharedTooLong = fmt.Errorf("ecies: shared secret is too long")
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ErrInvalidMessage = fmt.Errorf("ecies: invalid message")
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)
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// NIST SP 800-56 Concatenation Key Derivation Function (see section 5.8.1).
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func concatKDF(hash hash.Hash, z, s1 []byte, kdLen int) []byte {
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counterBytes := make([]byte, 4)
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k := make([]byte, 0, roundup(kdLen, hash.Size()))
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for counter := uint32(1); len(k) < kdLen; counter++ {
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(counterBytes, counter)
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hash.Reset()
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hash.Write(counterBytes)
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hash.Write(z)
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hash.Write(s1)
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k = hash.Sum(k)
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}
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return k[:kdLen]
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}
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// roundup rounds size up to the next multiple of blocksize.
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func roundup(size, blocksize int) int {
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return size + blocksize - (size % blocksize)
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}
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// deriveKeys creates the encryption and MAC keys using concatKDF.
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func deriveKeys(hash hash.Hash, z, s1 []byte, keyLen int) (Ke, Km []byte) {
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K := concatKDF(hash, z, s1, 2*keyLen)
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Ke = K[:keyLen]
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Km = K[keyLen:]
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hash.Reset()
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hash.Write(Km)
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Km = hash.Sum(Km[:0])
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return Ke, Km
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}
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// messageTag computes the MAC of a message (called the tag) as per
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// SEC 1, 3.5.
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func messageTag(hash func() hash.Hash, km, msg, shared []byte) []byte {
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mac := hmac.New(hash, km)
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mac.Write(msg)
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mac.Write(shared)
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tag := mac.Sum(nil)
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return tag
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}
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// Generate an initialisation vector for CTR mode.
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func generateIV(params *ECIESParams, rand io.Reader) (iv []byte, err error) {
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iv = make([]byte, params.BlockSize)
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_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, iv)
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return
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}
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// symEncrypt carries out CTR encryption using the block cipher specified in the
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func symEncrypt(rand io.Reader, params *ECIESParams, key, m []byte) (ct []byte, err error) {
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c, err := params.Cipher(key)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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iv, err := generateIV(params, rand)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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ctr := cipher.NewCTR(c, iv)
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ct = make([]byte, len(m)+params.BlockSize)
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copy(ct, iv)
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ctr.XORKeyStream(ct[params.BlockSize:], m)
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return
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}
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// symDecrypt carries out CTR decryption using the block cipher specified in
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// the parameters
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func symDecrypt(params *ECIESParams, key, ct []byte) (m []byte, err error) {
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c, err := params.Cipher(key)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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ctr := cipher.NewCTR(c, ct[:params.BlockSize])
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m = make([]byte, len(ct)-params.BlockSize)
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ctr.XORKeyStream(m, ct[params.BlockSize:])
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return
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}
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// Encrypt encrypts a message using ECIES as specified in SEC 1, 5.1.
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//
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// s1 and s2 contain shared information that is not part of the resulting
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// ciphertext. s1 is fed into key derivation, s2 is fed into the MAC. If the
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// shared information parameters aren't being used, they should be nil.
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func Encrypt(rand io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, m, s1, s2 []byte) (ct []byte, err error) {
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params, err := pubkeyParams(pub)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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R, err := GenerateKey(rand, pub.Curve, params)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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z, err := R.GenerateShared(pub, params.KeyLen, params.KeyLen)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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hash := params.Hash()
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Ke, Km := deriveKeys(hash, z, s1, params.KeyLen)
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em, err := symEncrypt(rand, params, Ke, m)
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if err != nil || len(em) <= params.BlockSize {
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return nil, err
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}
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d := messageTag(params.Hash, Km, em, s2)
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Rb := elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, R.PublicKey.X, R.PublicKey.Y)
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ct = make([]byte, len(Rb)+len(em)+len(d))
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copy(ct, Rb)
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copy(ct[len(Rb):], em)
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copy(ct[len(Rb)+len(em):], d)
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return ct, nil
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}
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// Decrypt decrypts an ECIES ciphertext.
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func (prv *PrivateKey) Decrypt(c, s1, s2 []byte) (m []byte, err error) {
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if len(c) == 0 {
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return nil, ErrInvalidMessage
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}
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params, err := pubkeyParams(&prv.PublicKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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hash := params.Hash()
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var (
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rLen int
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hLen int = hash.Size()
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mStart int
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mEnd int
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)
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switch c[0] {
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case 2, 3, 4:
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rLen = (prv.PublicKey.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 4
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if len(c) < (rLen + hLen + 1) {
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return nil, ErrInvalidMessage
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}
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default:
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return nil, ErrInvalidPublicKey
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}
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mStart = rLen
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mEnd = len(c) - hLen
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R := new(PublicKey)
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R.Curve = prv.PublicKey.Curve
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R.X, R.Y = elliptic.Unmarshal(R.Curve, c[:rLen])
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if R.X == nil {
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return nil, ErrInvalidPublicKey
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}
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z, err := prv.GenerateShared(R, params.KeyLen, params.KeyLen)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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Ke, Km := deriveKeys(hash, z, s1, params.KeyLen)
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d := messageTag(params.Hash, Km, c[mStart:mEnd], s2)
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(c[mEnd:], d) != 1 {
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return nil, ErrInvalidMessage
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}
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return symDecrypt(params, Ke, c[mStart:mEnd])
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}
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